


THE

8/5

Battle of Lundy's Lane.



BY ERNEST CRUIKSHANK,

CAPTAIN, 44TH BATTALION.

PRESS NOTICES.

"The details of the most stubborn and sanguinary engagement ever fought in the Province of Ontario are given by the author with a precision that excites admiration."—*Empire*.

"Flowerly language is not so much attempted by the author as an honest account of how each engagement was lost or won, and in this particular he succeeds admirably."—*Barrie Examiner*.

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"I have just finished reading your excellent and valuable pamphlet entitled *Bolton's Rangers*, and I congratulate you upon your lucid and candid presentation of history concerning these men and their work in the war between Great Britain and the Colonists. There are details of the story, here and there, in which I, as a reader of history, might not agree with you, but I am much pleased with the spirit which, in addition to your untiring industry, has made of this obscure story so real a contribution to genuine history."

[Letter from W. M. Elliot Griffis, LL.D., author of "Life of Sir Wm. Johnson."]


SKETCH OF BATTLEFIELD

SKETCH OF BATTLEFIELD

ENCLOSED IN SIR GEORGE PREVOST'S

DESPATCH TO LORD BATHURST.

DATED AT MONTREAL, 5TH AUGUST, 1814.



EXPLANATION OF SKETCH OF ACTION

14.

OF THE 25th JULY, 1814,

Enclosed in Sir George Prevost's despatch, No. 183, to Lord Bathurst,
dated at Montreal, 5th August, 1814:


FIRST POSITION.

- a*—Incorporated militia, commanded by Lieut. Col. Robinson.
- b*—Detachment of the King's, commanded by Capt. Campbell.
- c*—Two troops of the 19th Dragoons, which retired to
- d*—on *a* and *b* being ordered to retire.
- e*—89th, which arrived on the ground as the action commenced, with its left thrown back.
- f*—A detachment of the Royal Scots, commanded by Capt. Brereton, which was moved in the first instance to
- g*—and afterwards to
- h*—
- i*—
- j*—Glengarry regiment, which, after skirmishing with the enemy's advance, took its station on the right of the line, and finding the enemy were advancing directly in front, were ordered to
- k*—from whence, in junction with the embodied Militia and a few Indians, when the enemy were driven back, the Glengarry regiment advanced to
- l*—from which it retired to its final position at
- m*—
- n*—
- o*—
- p*—Embodied militia under Lieut. Col. Parry, who advanced to
- q*—after assisting to drive the enemy (who had advanced through the wood) directly in front of our position. They then retired to
- r*—

kk.

SECOND POSITION.

- aa*—Light company of the 41st, which arrived early in the action.
- bb*—89th regiment, which has changed its position on the Incorporated Militia and detachment of the King's regiment being ordered to retire from *a*, *b*, *k*, *n*
- cc*—Incorporated Militia and detachment of the King's regiment, which had retired from *a*, *b*, and *i*, to *a*.
- dd*—Left wing of the 103rd regiment, which, with the troops under Col. Scott, arrived as the troops were changing from the 1st to 2nd position.
- ee*—Right wing of 103rd regiment.
- ff*—Royal Scots regiment.
- gg*—Grenadiers of the 103rd regiment, and flank companies of the 104th, which afterwards advanced to
- hh.*—
- ii*—King's regiment.
- kk*—Indians and embodied Militia, who had retired from *m*.
- A*—American artillery.
- AA*—American columns advancing to the attack.
- B*—British field pieces.
- C*—The church.




THE
BATTLE OF LUNDY'S LANE

25th JULY, 1814.

A HISTORICAL STUDY.

BY ERNEST CRUIKSHANK, CAPTAIN, 44TH BATTALION.



THIRD EDITION.

WELLAND:
PRINTED AT THE TRIBUNE OFFICE.

ASSUMPTION COLLEGE LIBRARY

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

The very gratifying reception accorded to previous editions of this pamphlet, which are now exhausted, has induced the Lundy's Lane Historical Society to undertake the publication of a third, which has been carefully revised by the author.

Fort Erie, 18th December, 1893.

17552



THE BATTLE OF LUNDY'S LANE.

The month of December, 1813, was marked by the retirement of the American troops from their lines at Fort George, which they had occupied since the preceding May, under circumstances which tended to cover their arms with disgrace. Under the pretext that it was necessary to deprive their adversaries of shelter upon that frontier, the remaining inhabitants of Niagara were driven from their homes and the entire village committed to the flames. With the same intention Queenston was deliberately bombarded with red-hot shot from the batteries at Lewiston. Many isolated farm houses were destroyed by marauding parties of soldiers, or, when they proved too substantial for instant demolition, were rendered uninhabitable by removal of the doors and windows. The few cattle still remaining in the possession of the country people were mercilessly slaughtered or driven away, and their grain and flour removed or destroyed. On the 10th of December, General McClure wrote exultingly from Fort Niagara to Governor Tompkins of New York: "The village is now in flames and the enemy shut out of hope and means of wintering in Fort George. This step has not been resolved on without counsel," he added, "and is in conformity with the views of the Secretary of War, made known to me in previous communications." This, however, was strenuously denied by the latter. "My orders," he asserted, "were to burn it if necessary to the defense of Fort George, and not otherwise. But he does not defend Fort George, and then burns Niagara. My orders were given on the report of the General that the attack of Fort George might be covered by Newark."

Almost before the ink was dry on McClure's letter the flames of Niagara had become the signal for the rapid advance of a small British corps of observation, under Colonel John Murray, which lay at Twelve Mile Creek. Putting his men in sleighs, the British commander hurried forward through a blinding snowstorm, and fell upon the incendiaries before their work of destruction was completed. The village of Niagara had been already reduced to ashes, but the barracks and defences of Fort George were left comparatively uninjured, and the retreating garrison left the whole of their tents standing in the works they had so precipitately abandoned. The recovery of the left bank of the Niagara by the British was followed by the

surprise of Fort Niagara and the capture of the American batteries at Lewiston and Schlosser, and, finally, by the occupation of Buffalo, after a hard-fought action near Black Rock. Before the end of the month the Americans were driven from every defensive position upon their own bank of the stream, severe and stern retaliation had been exacted for their ravages upon the Canadian settlements, nearly every habitable building between Buffalo and Eighteen Mile Creek on Lake Ontario being laid in ruins, and the terrified inhabitants had fled beyond the Genessee. These successes put the small British force employed in possession of an ample and sorely needed supply of provisions, ammunition, and military stores of various kinds, besides furnishing them with comfortable winter quarters. Hitherto the men had been unprovided with winter clothing of any description, and they were still without a field-train, artificers, engineers, or regularly organized commissariat. During the preceding campaign, quantities of ammunition had been spoiled by being conveyed with the army in ordinary open farm wagons, for lack of regular tumbrils.¹ Drummond at once projected the reduction of Detroit and the destruction of the American squadron on Lake Erie, then lying at Put-in-Bay.² He pushed his outposts forward to the forks of the Thames, and his scouts penetrated to the borders of Lake St. Clair, and even ventured to cross into Michigan, where they captured the arms of a company of militia.³ The departure of the proposed expedition was delayed by the mildness of the weather, which kept the roads impassable until March.⁴ By that time the garrison of Detroit had been heavily reinforced, several thousand militia were collected at Put-in-Bay for the defence of the ships, and the energetic Governor of New York had been enabled to gather a large force of State troops at Batavia.

The British General was at the same time obliged to proceed to York to open the annual session of the Legislature of Upper Canada, for he united the functions of administrator of the civil government with those of commander of the forces, and during his absence the Americans began to contemplate the recovery of Fort Niagara. With this view three thousand regular troops were rapidly moved across the State of New York from Sackett's Harbor to the encampment at Batavia.⁵ It had been ascertained from deserters that great discontent existed in the battalion of the 8th or King's regiment, which garrisoned that post, and that the same cause which had prevented the advance of an expedition against Detroit had delayed the reinforcement of the division guarding the Niagara by troops from Lower Canada. In fact Drummond had been obliged to weaken it by send-

1. Drummond to Prevost, March 21; 2. Drummond to Prevost, Jan. 21; 3. Drummond to Prevost, Feb. 21; 4. Drummond to Capt. N. Freer, Feb. 19; 5. Lossing, Field Book of 1812, p. 762.

ing a detachment of the Newfoundland regiment and artillery to relieve Mackinac, and withdrawing the battalion of the 41st from York for the defence of Kingston.¹ The number of desertions from the garrison of Fort Niagara had become so great and the discontent of the men so pronounced, that the battalion was finally withdrawn and replaced by the 100th. Scarcely had this been accomplished than they, too, began to desert in such numbers that General Riall, who had been left in command of the division, was forced in utter despair to recommend the abandonment of "that cursed fort," as he forcibly designated it.² At that time the British army was largely recruited from the pauper and criminal classes, and many foreigners were enlisted even into regiments of the line. Thus, five men deserting in a body from the Royal Scots at this time were described as being all foreigners. Besides being imperfectly clothed and often harshly treated, they had received no pay for upwards of six months, and their discontent at the irksome and monotonous round of duty in Fort Niagara is not surprising.

Drummond, however, resolutely refused his consent to the evacuation of a post so important, and, as fine weather returned, desertions diminished. He was unremitting in his preparations for the coming campaign. Through the worst of weather and execrable roads he had hurried from York to Kingston, and from Kingston to Delaware, making inquiries into the resources of the country and the condition of the inhabitants.³ Ascertaining that the wheat crop near the frontier was likely to prove deficient, he promptly prohibited the distillation of grain, and issued orders for the formation of magazines in the vicinity of Long Point, a part of the country which had hitherto escaped the ravages of the invaders.⁴ The region between Chippawa and Fort Erie had been so completely laid waste that it remained almost uninhabited. In addition to his troops he had several thousand non-combatants to feed, and in the destitute condition of the country this seemed an almost hopeless task. Most of the western Indians that had survived General Proctor's defeat, as well as the whole of the Six Nations from the Grand River, three thousand persons in all, of whom two-thirds were helpless women and children, had sought refuge near the British cantonments at Burlington. Their depredations so harassed and alarmed many of the inhabitants in the vicinity that they abandoned their farms and took shelter in the soldiers' quarters.⁵ The homeless fugitives from the Niagara were also dependent upon the over-taxed commissariat. While his armed force numbered less than two thousand, between seven and eight

1. Drummond to Prevost, Feb. 8; 2. Riall to Drummond, March 15; 3. Drummond to Prevost, March 5; 4. Drummond to Prevost, January 25. "The crop in the Niagara District is short, but I think there will be enough for the Right Division if that at Long Point is collected in time;" 5. Drummond to Prevost, Feb. 8

thousand rations were issued daily. Already, in the month of January, it became evident that the supply of meat would soon be exhausted, and Drummond began to entertain serious apprehensions that he would be compelled to abandon all that part of the Province lying west of Kingston, from sheer want of food. Nor was the situation at the latter post much more encouraging. Five thousand rations were consumed there every day, and on the 5th April there remained but sixteen barrels of flour in store. In fact his embarrassments in this respect were quite as great as those of the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular war, who was so much engaged with this vital question of food and supplies that he was accustomed to say that he did not know whether he was much of a general but he felt certain that he was a first-rate commissariat officer. Although a vote of censure had been just passed on his predecessor in the Government by the Legislative Assembly of the Province, for having proclaimed martial law for the purpose of supplying his troops from the country, Drummond was then compelled by danger of absolute starvation to resort to it again, though with great anxiety and reluctance, as the inhabitants did not appear willing to part with their produce at any price. His efforts to induce the western Indians to remove to Lower Canada were unsuccessful, as well as his endeavors to persuade the Six Nations to return to their deserted farms on the Grand River. The inefficiency of the militia from want of discipline and defective equipment, as well as lack of competent officers, having become manifest, he directed the enlistment of a battalion of four hundred men from among them to serve during the war, with the intention of permitting the remainder to bestow their undivided attention upon their ordinary pursuits, except in the event of a levy *en masse* to repel actual invasion. Captain William Robinson, of the 8th, was appointed lieutenant-colonel, and Captain James Kerby, of the Lincoln Militia, major, of this corps. The ranks were rapidly filled up with stalwart young recruits, and it was armed and exercised as a battalion of light infantry, under the title of the Incorporated Militia. Several captured field-guns and tumbrils were fitted for active service, and supplies of grain and flour diligently collected in various parts of the country for the support of the forces in the field.¹

It seemed evident that a fresh attempt at invasion would not long be delayed. American newspapers clamored for the speedy recovery of Fort Niagara. Late in January Black Rock was re-occupied by their troops, and they began to annoy the British post at Fort Erie by the fire of artillery from batteries there.² At the same time they were reported to be building large barracks upon Lewiston Heights, several miles inland. The subsequent movement of a large

1. Drummond to Prevost, March 29; 2. Drummond to Prevost, Feb. 1.

body of troops from Sackett's Harbor in that direction was almost immediately revealed to the commandant at Kingston by deserters, and General Riall was placed on his guard. Severe cold weather, accompanied by heavy falls of snow during the latter part of March, delayed the progress of defensive works already commenced by the British, and early in April General Riall sallied out from Fort Niagara and levelled with the ground the earthworks which had been erected by the Americans the previous year along the right bank of the river from its mouth to Lewiston, fearing that they might be occupied by his adversaries.¹ A deserter, who came in a few days later, reported that seven thousand soldiers were already assembled near Buffalo. The difficulties of the situation daily increased, and the prospect for the future became more discouraging. A great council of the Indians of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, was convened by American agents at Dayton, and those present were informed that they must take up arms against the British or be treated as enemies of the United States. Each warrior was promised a stipend of seventy-five cents a day, and their wives and children would be retained as hostages. The Delawares, Senecas, Shawanees, and Wyandots joined in the war dance and were directed to assemble at Detroit.² Similar steps were taken to enlist the tribes of New York and Pennsylvania in the movement against Canada. Marauding parties from Detroit made frequent inroads into the Western District, carrying off the loyal inhabitants and destroying the settlements at Delaware and Point aux Pins. In the middle of May, eight hundred Americans conveyed in six ships of war made a descent upon Port Dover, and burned the entire village, turning the inhabitants out of doors in the midst of a chilling storm of rain and sleet.³ They then proceeded up the lake, destroying the mills near the coast, with the grain collected for grinding, as they went. At the same time it became known that another squadron of eight sail, filled with troops, had passed into Lake Huron with the intention of attacking Mackinac, the only post yet retained by the British in the west. The available store of grain and flour was much diminished by these incursions. Fresh meat was not to be had. The Indians daily consumed twice as much flour as the whole of the troops.⁴ In the small garrison of Fort Erie alone, not much exceeding one hundred persons, no less than sixty-nine cases of ague were reported in a single week. The Provincial Dragoons had become almost unfit for service from the miserable condition of their ill-fed and overworked horses. If Commodore Chauncey should succeed in getting out upon the lake with the formidable frigate he had recently launched at Sackett's Harbor,

1. Drummond to Prevost, March 31, April 13; 2. Hildreth's History, U. S.; 3. Pittsburg Mercury; 4. Drummond to Prevost, April 26.

the Americans would obtain as undisputed control of Lake Ontario as they already possessed of the upper lakes.

Upon the prorogation of the Assembly on the 18th March, Drummond returned to Kingston and threw himself with great vigor into the labor of providing for the defence of the Province. Every soldier that could be of the slightest use was set to work in the ship-yard, and two new frigates of the largest class were launched and made ready for the sea, while the American fleet would be yet unable to leave port for some weeks. Having thus obtained a decided superiority on Lake Ontario, he desired permission to attack the enemy's ships in their stronghold at Sackett's Harbor. But the Governor-General flatly refused to send him troops to enable him to undertake the expedition. "It is by wary measures and occasional daring enterprises, with apparently disproportionate means," he replied, "that the war has been sustained, and from that policy I am not disposed to depart."

However, on the 5th May, Drummond made a successful dash from Kingston upon the naval depot at Oswego, which he took and destroyed, and Sir James Yeo immediately established a strict blockade of Sackett's Harbor. The effect of these operations was to delay the equipment of the American squadron for several weeks, and consequently retard their invasion of Canada by way of the Niagara frontier. Early in May the troops intended for this purpose had begun to assemble at Buffalo, where a camp of instruction was immediately formed under the command of Brigadier-General Winfield Scott, one of the most talented and best trained officers in the United States army. It was proposed that the force employed should consist of not less than five thousand regular soldiers, and three thousand militia drawn from the States of New York and Pennsylvania. The cavalry and artillery were re-organized, and the enlistment of three new regiments of riflemen authorized. To encourage recruiting, a bounty of \$124 was offered to each person enlisting.¹ Most of the infantry regiments selected had served throughout the preceding campaigns, and consequently had seen quite as much active warfare as most of the troops that were likely to be opposed to them.

The spring elections had prostrated the Federal party in New York, and the Governor had at last a free hand. The Senate readily passed a bill authorizing the enlistment of 4,000 state troops to serve one year. The general order providing for the equipment of the New York contingent was issued in March, and authorized the organization of two infantry regiments of ten companies each, consisting of 108 officers and men, and an independent battalion, composed of one company of rifles, two of light infantry, and one of mounted rifles,

¹. Hildreth.

forming a brigade of 2,562 of all ranks, under Major General Peter B. Porter, recently a congressman from the Niagara District of New York, and one of the chief promoters of the war. For two months and a half both regulars and militia were constantly exercised in battalion and brigade drill from seven to ten hours a day, until they were considered to have attained a remarkable degree of efficiency. The French system of field exercise was adopted, and, as a proof of their rapidity in manœuvring, it is stated that Scott's brigade of four full battalions was able to execute an entire change of front to either flank in three minutes and a half.¹

The Pennsylvania detachment, numbering about 600 men, under Colonel Fenton, participated in the descent upon Port Dover, and did not arrive at Buffalo till late in June. Gen. P. B. Porter proceeded to Onondaga, the ancient council place of the Six Nations, and solicited the assistance of those tribes in the proposed invasion of Canada. This was promised readily enough, and a council was convened at Buffalo to ratify the engagement. All the nations except the Mohawks were represented at this meeting, and Le Fort, an Onondaga, was elected principal war chief. Mainly through the exertions of the celebrated Seneca chief Red Jacket, upwards of six hundred Indians were assembled to share in the expedition, some of them coming from the distant St. Regis village on the borders of Lower Canada, under the command of a chief who was given the rank of colonel in the United States army.²

While these extensive preparations for an invasion were in progress, Drummond was anxiously but fruitlessly urging Sir George Prevost to reinforce the British forces in that quarter without delay. His repeated warnings were to a very great extent unheeded by the Governor, who had his attention fixed upon the numerous American army massed upon the shores of Lake Champlain. Pencilled upon the margin of Drummond's letter of June 21st, 1814, expressing his firm belief that the main attack would be made on the Niagara, and that the movement of troops towards Plattsburg was simply a feint to prevent reinforcements from being despatched from Lower Canada to his assistance, there may be yet seen this significant memorandum in the handwriting of his irritable superior: "Much obliged to Lieut.-Gen. Drummond for his opinion, but it is entirely without foundation." Thus Drummond was forced to rely for the time being upon the troops already in the Upper Province. As soon as navigation opened he reinforced General Riall with the 103rd regiment, and a small company of marine artillery. Even after the arrival of these troops, the strength of the right division of the army in Upper Canada, distributed from York (Toronto) to Long Point upon Lake

1. Albany Argus; 2. Hubbard, Red Jacket, Hough Hist. St. Lawrence Co.

Erie did not much exceed 4,000 effectives of all arms.* It was deemed necessary for the protection of York and Burlington against a sudden descent by water, to maintain an entire battalion at each of those posts. Both flanks of the position on the Niagara were easily assailable by an enemy having command of the lakes, and the attack upon the settlements at Port Dover had justly aroused General Riall's apprehensions lest a strong force should be landed there and gain his rear by the western road. Having undisputed command of Lake Erie, an invading army might also be landed at Point Abino, or Sugar Loaf, from both of which places practicable roads led to the Niagara, and the successful pursuit of General Proctor the preceding autumn, as well as the recent inroads from Detroit, had demonstrated the possibility of the rapid advance of a body of mounted men and light infantry by way of the Thames. Therefore it became necessary to watch all these routes to guard against surprise. Lieut.-Col. Hamilton, with the headquarter wing of the 100th, was stationed at Dover, and detachments of light infantry and dragoons were posted at Delaware, Oxford, and the crossing of the Grand River (Brantford.) The actual force available for the defence

*Weekly distribution return of 22nd June, 1814.

FORT NIAGARA.		FORT ERIE AND DEPENDENCIES.	
Staff	21	19th Dragoons	25
Royal Artillery	13	Royal Engineers	1
R. M. Artillery	35	Royal Artillery	12
8th	1	8th	127
100th	612		
			165
Sick	682		
	25		
FORT GEORGE AND DEPENDENCIES.		LONG POINT AND DEPENDENCIES.	
19th Dragoons	33	19th Dragoons	63
Provincial Dragoons	21	Provincial Dragoons	15
Royal Engineers	1	103rd	214
Royal Artillery	23	Kent Volunteers	47
R. M. Artillery	38		
R. A. Drivers	3	Sick	339
Militia Artillery	2		6
1st Royal Scots	762		
103rd	140		
Colored Corps	25		
			417
	1050		
Sick	106		
QUEENSTON AND DEPENDENCIES.		BURLINGTON.	
19th Dragoons	9	Provincial Dragoons	3
Royal Artillery	40	Royal Artillery	19
R. A. Drivers	20	R. A. Drivers	17
1st Royal Scots	222	103rd	417
	291		
Sick	8		
CHIPIAWA AND DEPENDENCIES.		SICK	
19th Dragoons	5		
Royal Artillery	11		
Militia Artillery	9		
R. A. Drivers	7		
8th	459		
			406
	491		
Sick	88		
			1036
			53

of the Niagara was thus reduced to less than 2,800 regular soliders, 300 militia, and 150 Indians, distributed along a frontier of thirty-six miles, besides furnishing a garrison for Fort Niagara.¹ Slight field-works had been constructed at Chippawa and Queenston, and a new redoubt built at Niagara to command the mouth of the river, at first named Fort Riall, but subsequently known as Fort Mississauga.² When these works and Forts Erie and George were properly garrisoned scarcely seven hundred men remained available for field operations. Many of the soldiers still nominally effective were so enfeebled by disease, exposure, and fatigue in watching such an extended line, that they had really become unfit for active service. The surgeon of the 8th recommended that the battalion of that regiment, then stationed at Chippawa and Niagara Falls, should be immediately removed, as the hospitals were full, and nearly every man in it had been down with dysentery or intermittent fever within twelve months.³ The Royal Scots had suffered nearly as much in the same way. Writing from Kingston to Sir George Prevost, Drummond thus summed up the situation: "One of the best regiments is shut up in Fort Niagara, another decidedly inefficient, and a third expected to be so if compelled to take the field."⁴ Late in June he determined to relieve the 8th by the 41st, and sent forward the Incorporated Militia to the frontier, but was unable to remove the Royals as he desired to do.

Deserters who came into the British lines agreed in representing that an attack was imminent, and reported that the ardor of the New York Militia had been much increased by the distribution of hand-bills announcing that the Emperor of the French had gained a great victory near Paris, in which he had taken the sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and 40,000 prisoners. A squadron of nine armed vessels had been assembled at Buffalo, and the enemy were described as collecting boats in Tonawanda Creek, with the intention, it was conjectured, of crossing the river below Grand Island. A party of Indians, under Captains Caldwell and Elliott, was then sent out from Fort Niagara in the hope of penetrating their designs, but although they ranged the country for a dozen miles and burned a large new barracks upon Lewiston Heights, they failed to discover anything of importance. Owing to this uncertainty respecting his enemy's intentions, General Riall was obliged to retain the greater part of his field force at Chippawa and Queenston, and leave his right wing comparatively weak. In Fort Erie there was a garrison of 125 men, very ineffective from sickness. Colonel Pearson, with a detachment of Lincoln Militia, the light companies of the Royals and 100th, watched

1. James 2. Capt. Martin to Prevost, July 3. 3. Drummond to Prevost, May 21. 4. Drummond to Prevost, July 4.

the river from its head to Chippawa, where five companies of the 100th were posted. The 103rd was at Burlington, the Glengarry Light Infantry at York, and the 8th had begun its march to Lower Canada, in the hope of regaining health. Both in the Second Battalion of the 41st and the 103rd there were several companies of mere boys, and the majority of these corps were so youthful or otherwise inefficient that they had been retained in garrison during the whole of the previous year.

Many of the disloyal inhabitants had fled from the Province during the two preceding years; others had been taken into custody, and most of those who refused to take the oath of allegiance were sent into the United States. "It is but justice to say," Drummond remarked, "that by far the greater part of the inhabitants are well disposed, and many have on various occasions manifested their loyalty to the service by their actions in the field. Those chiefly who have shown an opposite disposition are such as from time to time have crept into the Province from the neighboring States and settled on lands purchased from individuals."

A considerable number of the Lincoln Militia had been paroled by the enemy during their occupation of portions of the district in 1813, and could not be again required to serve during the war. The general proposed to increase the Incorporated battalion to 900 men by the draft of one-fourteenth of the male population capable of bearing arms. But he was decidedly opposed to the employment of the remainder in military service, except when forced to do so by the most imperative necessity. "I regret," he said, that our present circumstances should render it necessary to call upon the yeomanry of the country for their services in the field while their farms must be neglected, especially when produce and provisions of every kind have become very scarce and extravagantly dear, and it is with difficulty the commissariat are able to procure the necessary supplies. These considerations would induce me most willingly to dispense with the military for the domestic services of the militia if our regular forces here were such as to enable me to do so."¹

Of all these circumstances the enemy were fairly well informed. A careful estimate in April placed the British regular force on the Niagara frontier at 1,940 men.² Since the opening of navigation one of their armed vessels had cruised day and night along the north shore of Lake Erie, constantly landing and taking off spies.

At this opportune moment, the American army was skilfully disembarked under cover of the guns of a brig of war and two schooners, without the slightest opposition, in two divisions, one

1. Letter to Lord Bathurst, March 20, 1814. 2. Niles' Register, 1814; Royals, 780; 8th, 500; 41st, 300; Artillery, 160; Dragoons, 100; Colored Company, 100.

above and the other a short distance below Fort Erie, at daybreak on the 3rd July. Their movements were veiled by a heavy fog, and a picket of the 19th Dragoons had barely time to escape. The regular force of the invading army consisted of the 9th, 11th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, and 25th United States Infantry, part of the 2nd Rifles, a squadron of cavalry, and four companies of artillery, numbering between four and five thousand of all ranks, and forming two brigades, under Generals Scott and Ripley. The militia and Indians, composing a third brigade, under the command of General Porter, it is probable exceeded two thousand.¹ The entire force was commanded by Major-General Jacob Brown, formerly an officer in the New York Militia, who had gained much celebrity among his countrymen by his success, or rather his good fortune, in the defence of Sackett's Harbor the year before, and had been rewarded by a commission in the United States army. His military knowledge was so slight that General Wilkinson asserted that he was unable to post the guards of

1. Porter to Gov. Tompkins, 3rd July, 1814. Mr. Adams furnishes the following return, which, however, is evidently incomplete:

Monthly return, 30th June, 1814.

1ST. BRIGADE.

	Present for Duty.		Aggregate Present and Absent.
	N. C. O. and men.	Officers.	
9th.	332	16	642
11th.	416	17	577
22nd.	217	12	287
25th.	354	16	619
General Staff.		4	4
	1319	65	2129

2ND BRIGADE.

21st.	651	25	917
23rd.	341	8	496
General Staff.		2	2
	992	35	1415

HINDMAN'S BATTALION OF ARTILLERY.

Towson's Company.	89		101
Biddle's Company.	80		104
Ritchie's Company.	96	15	133
Williams' Company.	62		73
			413

STRENGTH, 1ST JULY, 1814.

Artillery.	330	15	413
1st Brigade.	1312	65	2122
2nd Brigade.	992	36	1415
Porter's Brigade.	710	43	830
	3344	159	4780

Although there is a general agreement among American historians in stating Brown's army at this time at 5,000 men, Mr. Adams would have us believe that it did not exceed 3,600. Neither the dragoons, bombardiers nor Indians are included in either of these returns, and if we can believe a confidential letter from Gen. Porter, his brigade must have been more than twice as strong as represented in this return. On July 3rd he wrote to Gov. Tompkins from Buffalo: "Gen. Brown has crossed the Niagara and taken Fort Erie with its garrison of 120 men, without the loss of a man. I had 500 Indians and 150 mounted men with me where Gen. Brown wished me to be at the time of crossing. The infantry I left at Batavia with Col. Swift, to wait for stores. My whole force will be about 1000 volunteers and 500 Indians. The Pennsylvania Volunteers will increase this to above 2,000." Stone's command of mounted riflemen alone numbered 162.—Dwyer Hist., Livingston County.

a camp correctly, and told a queer story of his planting a battery in a hollow for the advantage of elevating the guns to fire at the heights above. But he was undoubtedly brave and energetic. Ripley was another active politician, who had been speaker of the Massachusetts Assembly, but Scott and most of the field officers were professional soldiers.

Brown's instructions directed him to force his way to Burlington, leaving the forts at the mouth of the river on one side and severing their communications with York. Having gained the head of the lake, he was to await there the arrival of Commodore Chauncey's squadron, when he was given discretionary authority to invest and reduce the British forts or move directly upon Kingston, as circumstances might seem to direct.

The views and expectations of the Secretary of War are described in a letter to the President on the 30th April, in which he says:—“Eight, or even six, thousand men landed in the bay between Point Abino and Fort Erie and operating either on the line of the Niagara or more directly, if a more direct route is found, against the British post at the head of Burlington Bay, cannot be resisted with effect without compelling the enemy so to weaken his more eastern posts as to bring them within reach of our means at Sackett's Harbor and Plattsburg.”

In the letter, June 10, which actually put Brown's army in motion, he informed that officer that the Secretary of the Navy was of the opinion that Chauncey's squadron would not be ready to co-operate before the 15th July, but, he added: “To give, however, immediate occupation to your troops, and to prevent their blood from stagnating, why not take Fort Erie and its garrison, stated at three or four hundred men? Land between Point Abino and Erie in the night; assail the fort by land and water; push forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippawa; and be governed by circumstances in either stopping there or going farther. Boats may follow and feed you. If the enemy concentrates his whole force on this line, as I think he will, it will not exceed two thousand men.”

Not a shot had been fired while the invaders were landing. Fort Erie was immediately invested, and although Drummond had confidently anticipated that an invading army would be detained several days before it, the commandant surrendered the same evening. A battalion of United States rifles, accompanied by a strong body of militia, appeared simultaneously upon Lewiston Heights, alternately menacing Queenston and Fort Niagara.

Advancing to reconnoitre with his light troops, Pearson found the Americans posted in force upon the heights opposite Black Rock, and next day he was steadily pushed back by their advance, destroying the

bridges upon the road as he retired. These were rapidly rebuilt by his pursuers, who encamped for the night within sight of the British field-works at Chippawa. General Brown was apparently well informed respecting the movements and numbers of his opponent, for he estimated that Riall could not bring more than a thousand men into the field, and his advance was conducted with the confidence engendered by consciousness of an overwhelming numerical superiority. Although the march was a continual skirmish, his advance-guard was pushed boldly onward, and brushed the opposing light troops out of its path with ease. Proclamations were distributed among the inhabitants assuring them that "All persons demeaning themselves peaceably and pursuing their private business should be treated as friends."

Major-General Phineas Riall, the British commander, was an officer of twenty years standing, yet had seen little actual warfare. He is described as a short, stout, near-sighted man, of an impetuous temperament, and rashly brave. Five companies of the Royals were hurried forward by him to Chippawa, and a message despatched for the instant recall of the 8th. That battalion had already reached York before it was overtaken, and did not arrive at Niagara until the morning of the 5th. Riall was accordingly compelled to await the approach of the invaders at Chippawa, instead of assailing them upon their march, as he had at first intended. Reconnoitering their position on the morning of the 5th, he estimated their force in sight at 2,000 men, and the 8th having come up about noon, he determined to attack them without further delay. Throughout the morning the British light troops and cavalry were busy. They drove in a strong picket-guard, capturing a wounded man and besieging the remainder in a farm house until relieved. Parties of scouts passed quite around the American camp, and their reports induced the belief that the main body of their army had not yet come up. Riall had then three skeleton battalions of infantry, numbering 1,300 rank and file, a troop of the 19th Dragoons, six pieces of field artillery, 300 Indians and about the same number of Lincoln Militia.¹ In the meantime the Americans in his front had been joined by Ripley's entire brigade and the greater part of Porter's, and now numbered nearly five thousand combatants, with nine guns. They had encamped behind Street's Creek, a shallow stream less than twenty yards in width at its mouth, and everywhere easily fordable. A tract of cultivated land in their front, divided into fields by ordinary log or brushwood fences, extended from the river to dense woods on the left, a distance of less than half a mile. Near the Chippawa, a thin belt of trees stretched down almost to the water's edge, partially concealing the movements of either army from the other.

1. Riall to Drummond, July 6.

Late in the afternoon Riall provoked the attention of his adversary by pushing forward a detachment of the 2nd and 3rd Lincoln, under Lieut.-Col. Dickson, and the whole body of Indians, led by Capt. John Norton, to occupy the woods on the flank of his position. Brown promptly despatched a portion of Porter's brigade to drive them back. Finding that they offered an obstinate resistance, and were even gaining ground, he continued to support Porter with fresh troops until some 1,300 militia and Indians were engaged on his part. The skirmish lasted half an hour, in the usual Indian fashion, with a great deal of firing and very little bloodshed, when, perceiving themselves outnumbered, the British Indians began to retire. The three light infantry companies of regulars were then sent forward to their assistance. Being well versed in this kind of warfare from the experience of former campaigns, they concealed themselves in the thickets and awaited the approach of the Americans until they arrived within a few yards. A single heavy volley, pealing through the woods, threw them into utter confusion. They were, at the same time, fiercely assailed in flank by the militia and Norton's Indians, and driven quite through the ranks of the company of regulars formed in reserve beyond Street's Creek, and did not rally until the 25th U. S. Infantry and a squadron of dragoons were sent to their support. Several prisoners, among them three field-officers of the Pennsylvania regiment and a Cayuga chief, were taken, and fifteen Indians and a number of militia left dead on the field.¹ Le Fort, himself, was mortally wounded, and Dochstader, chief of the Oneidas, was among the killed. Towards the close of this contest Col. Dickson of the Lincoln militia was wounded and the command of his battalion, which had behaved very gallantly and sustained a comparatively heavy loss, devolved on Major David Secord, a veteran of the Revolution. Meanwhile Riall had passed the Chippawa with his entire force, and advanced three guns to engage the American artillery, which had taken up a position to command the road in their front. Observing this, Scott's brigade defiled across the bridge, and deploying under fire with remarkable steadiness and precision formed beyond the creek, while Ripley forded the stream higher up and prolonged their line of battle to the edge of the woods. The British artillery was pushed gradually forward until within four hundred yards of their antagonists, and begun the action with great spirit. Three guns of Towson's battery replied, but one of them was speedily dismounted, and the others seemed in a fair way of being driven out of action, when one of the British tumbrils was struck by a shell and blew up, disabling several men and horses besides causing great confusion and depriving them of much of their fixed ammunition.²

1. White, Lossing, Stone. 2. Capt. Mackonochie to Maj.-Gen. Glasgow, Aug. 19.

In consequence of this unfortunate event General Riall was obliged to bring forward his infantry prematurely to the relief of the guns, which were then menaced from the right by a battalion of infantry. Forming six companies of the Royal Scots and five companies of the 100th into two columns, parallel with each other, and placing a light field piece upon each flank and one in the interval, he led them in person against the centre of his opponent's position. The 8th, enfeebled by disease and wearied by its long march, was held in reserve. Each of these battalions, their light companies having been detached, numbered less than four hundred rank and file. Scott's brigade alone thus very materially outnumbered the force about to attack it.

By the time this formation had been completed, the whole of the American field artillery had been brought into action, and the British guns were almost reduced to silence. Their pieces were then shotted with canister, and turned upon the advancing columns, while the 9th and 11th regiments, forming the wings of their line, were wheeled inwards and overlapped them on either flank.¹ As soon as the British approached within musketry range they were assailed by a fierce and incessant fusilade. Losing heavily at every step, they moved steadily forward until within two hundred yards of their adversaries, when they received the command to charge. The field here was intersected by deep furrows and covered with tall grass, which greatly impeded their movements and rendered their footing uncertain. Lieut.-Col. Gordon and the Marquis of Tweeddale fell desperately wounded at the head of their battalions. Nearly every field-officer was struck down. The men fell in heaps under the scathing fire of the enemy. As they moved forward the American artillery literally tore great gaps through their ranks, which for some time were steadily closed up. But finally the survivors were involved in inextricable confusion, and began to straggle to the rear when within about eighty yards of the enemy's position. Riall exposed himself recklessly, and yet escaped unhurt, although his clothing was pierced with several bullets, but all his efforts to re-form the ranks in the face of that murderous fire were unavailing. The 8th was brought up to cover the retreat, which was accomplished in tolerable order, as the Americans showed little inclination to follow up their advantage. Most of the dead and many of the severely wounded were left upon the field, and the guns were removed only by the gallant exertions of some troopers of the 19th Dragoons, who attached their own horses to the carriages, and rode off with them in the teeth of the enemy.

The easy triumph of the Americans was mainly due to the

1. Major Hindman to Gen. Brown: Lossing.

excellent practice of their artillery, although their great superiority in numbers was no doubt an important factor in their success.¹ Judging from its loss, Ripley's brigade was scarcely engaged, and Porter's, as we have seen, was beaten entirely out of action at a very early period. Their loss was variously stated, and probably did not exceed four hundred of all ranks. Col. Campbell, the destroyer of Port Dover, was mortally wounded. On the other hand, General Riall lost upwards of five hundred, of whom two-fifths were killed or missing. Of nineteen officers of the 100th who went into the action, fourteen were killed or disabled, with one hundred and ninety non-commissioned officers and men. Only 146 unwounded men of this battalion returned from the field. Lyons' company, posted on the extreme left of the line and directly in front of the enemy's principal battery, went into action with thirty-five officers and men, of whom only six escaped unhurt.²

The seven companies of the Royals suffered still more severely, eleven officers and two hundred and seven rank and file being returned as killed, wounded and missing. Altogether these two battalions lost four hundred and twenty-two officers and men out of a total of only nine hundred and fifty. Among the killed was Capt. Bailey, who had greatly distinguished himself at the assault of Fort Niagara. On the whole, Riall's force was reduced by more than one-third.³ The loss sustained by the Lincoln Militia indicates that they fought with equal stubbornness. Six officers and forty men were returned as killed or wounded out of 110 actually engaged. Captains John Rowe, formerly a sergeant in Butler's Rangers, and George Turney, the son of a veteran officer in the same corps, were among the slain.

Two days later the British general was compelled to destroy his works and abandon his position upon the left bank of the Chippawa in consequence of a turning movement directed against his right flank. The redoubt at Queenston was likewise evacuated, and he leisurely retired upon Fort George. He had already been deserted by nearly the whole of his Indians, and by many of the militia, who were alarmed for safety of their families.⁴ They were directed to collect their cattle and re-assemble at Burlington, which most of them succeeded in doing. Already provisions had begun to fail and the garrisons were placed on half allowance. Parties were sent out to scour the country and drive cattle into Fort George under the guidance of twenty officers of the Lincoln regiments. The invading forces advanced to the summit of Queenston Heights, whence they menaced the British position. Here they remained perfectly inactive for several days. On the night of the 12th Major Evans advanced with

1. Wilkinson's Memoirs. 2. Ridout Letters. 3. Drummond to Prevost, July 13. 4. Riall to Drummond, July 8.

Sadlier's company of the 8th, numbering only thirty-four rank and file, to reconnoitre their outposts, in the hope of taking a few prisoners. His retreat was intercepted by General Swift, of the New York Militia, with one hundred and twenty volunteers, who was also upon a scouting expedition, and a sharp skirmish took place, in which Evans lost six men and the American leader was killed.¹ The movements of his opponent next morning led Riall to believe that an attempt would be made upon the depot at Burlington, and having increased the garrisons of the three forts at the mouth of the river to 1,554 effectives,* he resumed his retreat towards the head of the lake with only 836 officers and men of all arms, while the Americans at Queenston were firing minute-guns for their dead general.² The same day Colonel Henry Scott advanced from Burlington with six hundred of the 103rd, leaving the two boy-companies and some invalids and militia in garrison there, and joined Riall at the Twenty Mile Creek, where the united force encamped upon the heights.

The prospect of a successful defence of the forts, if resolutely attacked, was not assuring. Fort George possessed no means of resisting an assault beyond a single bad row of pickets, and certainly could not have repelled the force under General Brown's command had he ventured to attack it. The others could then be easily reduced in succession by bombardment.³

For more than a week Brown lingered on the brow of Queenston "mountain," gazing anxiously out upon the blue waters of the lake below, in the vain hope of catching a glimpse of Chauncey's squadron speeding to his assistance. From time to time his columns wound down into the plain and crept within distant cannon-shot of the batteries of Fort George, and as often retired to their tents again without accomplishing anything. During all this time they did not even succeed in establishing an effective blockade of the British works. Upon one occasion two British field-guns galloped out of Fort George and shelled their rear-guard, and the same day five of their cavalry videttes were surprised and carried off by militia lurking in the woods along their line of march. The women and children in the farm houses and fields by the wayside conspired to mislead and baffle the detachments sent in pursuit.

Meanwhile a levy *en masse* of the militia from Long Point to the Bay of Quinte had been proclaimed, and in a few days Riall was joined by upwards of a thousand men of different battalions, "many of them fine serviceable fellows," but badly armed and undisciplined. A goodly number of these marched in from the London district. Those who had temporarily deserted him rapidly recovered from their

1. Evans to Riall, July 13. 2. Royals, 320; 8th, 200; Incorporated Militia, 316; three 6-pounders, one 5½ inch howitzer, Riall to Drummond, July 15. 3. Riall to Drummond, July 12.

*Fort George, 733; Missassauga, 404; Niagara, 647; sick, 124.

panic, and a considerable number of stragglers was cut off by them in the vicinity of Queenston and St. Davids, and many deserters were brought into the British lines. On the other hand, the course of the American militia and Indians was marked by pillage and rapine. "The whole population is against us," wrote Major McFarland of the 23rd U. S. Infantry. "Not a foraging party goes out but is fired on, and frequently returns with diminished numbers. This state was to have been anticipated. The militia and Indians have plundered and burnt everything." Much to their surprise they found that the Canadian militia were still "fervent beyond parallel in the cause of their king and country." Willcocks' battalion of Canadian refugees eagerly seized the opportunity of wreaking summary vengeance upon their loyalist enemies. Old men and boys were sent as prisoners to the United States, and women maltreated. Their example was emulated by Colonel Stone's command of mounted riflemen, branded as "licensed plunderers" by General Riall. It was even confidently asserted that a number of silver spoons were found in General Swift's pocket after his death, which he had taken from a neighboring farm house less than one hour before.

Before crossing the river, Gen. Brown had intimated that he expected to be in a position to invest Forts George and Missassauga on the 10th of July. This engagement he might have fulfilled to an hour had the American fleet been in sight. Contrary to the advice of his engineer officers, he deemed it necessary to wait for siege-guns, and wrote an urgent despatch to hasten their arrival. But his letter found Commodore Chauncey sick in bed, and that prudent commander positively refused to allow the next senior officer to take his ships to sea.

The partisan warfare daily grew keener. On the 15th an American wagon train was attacked at Queenston, and the greater part of it destroyed. On the following night an outpost at Fort Erie was cut off to a man. Next day the militia surprised and took a cavalry picket in St. Davids, Willcocks himself having a narrow escape, and another party nearly captured Major Mallory at Beaver Dams. On the 18th, when the main body of the American army was reconnoitring Fort George, they again dashed into St. Davids and Queenston, making more prisoners. These incidents so exasperated the invaders that upon the 19th they burnt the entire village of St. Davids, containing some thirty or forty houses, alleging, probably with truth, that the inhabitants had participated in the attack on their wagons and had killed an officer of dragoons. This was followed up by the destruction of every dwelling between Queenston and Niagara Falls. These proceedings were attended by such revolting conduct on the part of their militia under Colonel Stone, that Major McFarland, who

was sent to cover their retreat, declared that he would have resigned his commission if the commanding officer had not been dismissed from the service.

Having been joined by several companies of the Glengarry Light Infantry from York, under the ever-active Fitzgibbon, Riall advanced the same day to Ten Mile Creek with his left wing, composed of militia and Indians, extending as far as DeCew's Falls, and menacing the rear of the American position by way of Lundy's Lane. The entire male population immediately flew to arms, and joined him, actuated by a spirit of intense hostility towards the invaders. His scouts found their way into St. Davids, Queenston, and even Chippawa, harassing the enemy's pickets, and picking up stragglers. His apprehensions were, however, at the same time, aroused by mysterious negotiations on the part of his Indians with their kinsmen in the American service, and a raid from Detroit upon the defenceless settlement at Port Talbot, which was ruthlessly destroyed, compelled him to detach the Oxford battalion of militia and some Indians in that direction, as a precautionary measure.¹ On the 20th, leaving about 300 men in possession of the abandoned redoubt on Queenston Heights, Brown advanced with the remainder of his army within two miles of Fort George, where he encamped and began to collect materials for siege batteries. He appeared to have entertained the hope that by his movement, the British commander might be induced to hazard another engagement with inferior numbers to relieve the garrison. Two days later Riall succeeded in concentrating in advance of Twelve Mile Creek 1,700 regular troops, including the Glengarry Light Infantry and Incorporated Militia, 700 Lincoln Militia, and an equal number of Indians, in readiness to pounce upon the flank and rear of his adversary should he attempt the actual investment of the forts. Fort George was then garrisoned by 400 of the Royal Scots and 260 of the 100th, Fort Missassauga by 290 of the 8th, a company of negro volunteers, and a few artillerymen and artificers, making an aggregate of 400 persons, while Fort Niagara was occupied by 550 men of the 41st, and fifty artillerymen. Nearly one-fourth of the garrisons were, however, upon the sick list, and many others too young to be of much service.²

Deserters from the American army came into the British lines every day, and from them it was ascertained that General Brown had been joined by considerable reinforcements since the action at Chippawa, and that he brought over nearly the whole of his supplies from Lewiston, where he had collected many boats, thus avoiding the necessity of preserving an uninterrupted line of communications with Fort Erie. Reconnoitring the same afternoon with thirty picked

1. Riall to Drummond, July 17; Ibid, July 19. 2 Riall to Drummond, July 17: Ibid, July 22.

men, Captain Fitzgibbon obtained an excellent view of his entire army spread out in the plain below, from the summit of Queenston Heights. As he watched their movements their tents were struck, and their retiring columns filled the roads, extending from De Puisaye's house, within gun-shot of Fort George, without a break to the village of Queenston, a distance of more than five miles. Linger-
ing too long in his covert, he was discovered by their light troops, and hotly pursued almost to the British outposts upon the Ten Mile Creek.¹ That night the American army again encamped at Queen-
ston, the British advance-guard was pushed forward to Four Mile Creek, and communication with the garrisons re-established.

The sudden retirement of the invading forces is said to have been caused by intelligence that the militia of the Province was rising *en masse* with the intention of cutting off their retreat. The next morning General Brown received a despatch from Sackett's Harbor, informing him that the American squadron was still closely blockaded there, and he immediately retired behind the Chippawa. Relinquishing all hopes of co-operation on the part of the fleet, he stated that his intentions were to disencumber his army of all unnecessary baggage, and having lulled his antagonist's suspicions by his abrupt retrograde movement, to make a rapid march upon Burlington.² He entertained no doubt of his ability to cope with the British army in the field and to march in any direction through the country, but had based his hopes of reducing the forts entirely on the arrival of Chauncey's squadron with heavy artillery. Unfortunately for the success of this plan, Sir Gordon Drummond arrived the same day at York, bringing with him from Kingston 400 of the second battalion of the 89th, under that sturdy soldier, Colonel Joseph Warton Morrison, who had won the hard-fought battle at Chrysler's farm the autumn before. The two flank companies of the 104th, completed by volunteers to the number of sixty rank and file each, had already been sent forward to strengthen Riall, under the command of their fiery-hearted Lieutenant-Colonel, his nephew, William Drummond of Keltie. Further reinforce-
ments, consisting of the Regiment De Watteville and detach-
ments of other corps, were likewise on the way from Kingston, leaving that important post almost without a garrison.

One of Drummond's first acts was to order the discharge of all the very young, as well as the old and weakly militiamen, with the double object of relieving the strain upon his supply of provisions and setting them at liberty to gather their hay. Learning that the Americans had established their base of supplies at Lewiston, he im-
mediately embarked the 89th in the two armed vessels, *Star* and *Charwell*, leaving York garrisoned by only a few invalids, with instruc-

1. Riall to Drummond, July 22. 2. Brown to Armstrong, Aug. 7.

tions to proceed directly to the mouth of the Niagara. Upon its arrival, Lieut.-Col. Tucker was instructed to draft two-thirds of the garrisons from the different forts, making, with the 89th and flank companies of the 104th, a body of about 1,500 men, and at day-break on the 25th to assail the batteries the Americans were said to have begun near Youngstown, while General Riall was directed at the same time to advance towards St. Davids for the purpose of distracting the attention of their force in Canada and preventing them from sending reinforcements across the river. A bold and successful stroke at their *depot* of supplies, he argued, would seriously jeopardize the position of the invaders, while he explicitly stated that he did not wish to risk an engagement upon the left bank of the river until the remainder of his reinforcements came up, when he confidently expected to finish the campaign at a blow.¹

Riall, too, admonished by the check he had received at Chippawa, pronounced strongly against meeting the enemy again in the field until the reinforcements already on the march, consisting of three strong battalions of regular troops, had arrived, which he hoped would "create such a force as to render the enemy's discomfiture and annihilation complete."² But the merest accident compelled them to fight at a disadvantage in defiance of their convictions.

Late on the afternoon of the 24th, Drummond himself went on board the schooner *Netley*, and set sail for Niagara with the intention of assuming the command of the forces in the field. He was then in his forty-third year, an active, brave, resolute, and skilful soldier, who had seen war in Egypt, Holland, and the West Indies, during a quarter of a century of military life. He had been selected for a command in Canada by the Duke of York on account of his "zeal, intelligence and local knowledge." The same authority designated General Riall as "an active and intelligent young man." They were nobly supported by many brave and skilful officers. Colonel Scott had served under Abercromby in Egypt and under Wellington in India. Harvey, Morrison, and Pearson had repeatedly distinguished themselves in the preceding campaign. Few men in that fighting age could lead a charge better than Drummond of Keltie.

When he arrived in the mouth of the river at daybreak next morning, he learned that the situation had materially changed. General Brown had retired to Chippawa, and Riall had taken advantage of this fact to push forward his brigade of light troops the night before, to seize the important strategic position near Niagara Falls commanding the junction of Lundy's Lane with the Portage Road, with the intention of supporting it that morning with the whole of his division. At nightfall on the 24th, the disposition of the British

1. Harvey to Tucker, July 23. 2. Riall to Drummond, July 12.

forces was the following:—The First Brigade, Colonel Hercules Scott commanding, composed of a detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons, half a battalion of the 8th, and seven companies of the 103rd, with two 6-pound field-guns, lay at Twelve Mile Creek; the Second Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Tucker, consisting of half a battalion of the Royal Scots, half a battalion of the 8th, the second battalion of the 41st, and a wing of the 100th, with a detachment of the Royal Artillery in charge of two 24-pound and two 6-pound field-pieces, occupied the forts at the mouth of the river, and had just been joined by Colonel Morrison with his detachment of the 89th; the Third, or Light Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Pearson, was made up of a troop of the 19th, Major Lisle, the light companies of the 8th and 103rd, the Glengarry Light Infantry, and the Incorporated Militia, encamped at Four Mile Creek; the Fourth Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Parry, consisting of three battalions of embodied militia, and a body of Indians, formed the right wing of the British line, stretching along the Twelve Mile Creek as far as DeCew's Falls, while the flank and four battalion-companies of the Royal Scots, and four battalions of embodied militia, with three 6-pounders and a howitzer, were held in reserve under Lieut.-Col. John Gordon. This seems a formidable force on paper, but the Royals, 8th and 100th, were mere skeleton battalions. The latter could muster but one captain, three subalterns and 250 effective men, while the others were very little stronger. The militia regiments were weak in numbers, and miserably armed and equipped. Altogether there were about 4,000 men scattered over thirty miles of country, but capable of being concentrated at a few hours' notice to resist the advance of the enemy.

On the evening of the 23rd the whole of General Brown's army once more encamped in the plain between Street's Creek and the Chippawa, but a battalion of riflemen and a regiment of militia were still posted on Lewiston Heights, having their pickets advanced as far as Youngstown. Their principal magazine of supplies had, however, been removed to Schlosser.

At midnight Colonel Pearson received orders to advance with his brigade, numbering about 800 of all ranks, and by seven o'clock on the morning of the 25th he had taken possession of the high ground at Lundy's Lane without encountering the slightest opposition. In the course of its march this detachment was animated by the spectacle of two stout-hearted countrywomen bringing in an American soldier whom they had disarmed and made prisoner.¹

Instructions had been issued to Colonel Scott to move upon the same point from Twelve Mile Creek at three in the morning, but these orders were subsequently countermanded, and his brigade

1. Narrative of Col. Jas. McQueen.

remained in their quarters until afternoon. In the course of the morning Riall rode forward, accompanied only by Lieut.-Col. Drummond and a small escort, and joined Pearson.¹

These movements induced an immediate change in Drummond's plan of operations. Colonel Morrison, with the 89th, a detachment of the Royals, Lieut. Hemphill, and another of the 8th, Captain Campbell, two 24-pound brass field-pieces, Lieut. Tomkins and a party of rocketeers under Sergeant Austin, was directed to march by way of Queenston to the support of General Riall at Lundy's Lane, while Lieut.-Col. Tucker, with 500 men of the Royals and 41st, and some Indians, advanced along the other bank upon Lewiston, accompanied upon the river by a number of boats, manned by seamen under Captain Alexander Dobbs. Tucker's column arrived at Lewiston about noon, and drove out the garrison after a trifling skirmish, capturing a hundred tents and a small quantity of other stores. The light company of the 41st and the detachment of the Royals were then brought over to Queenston and added to Morrison's column, increasing it to about 800 officers and men.

After a brief halt the march was resumed, and towards six o'clock a dragoon rode up in haste to meet General Drummond, who was near the rear of the column and still several miles from his destination, bearing a message from Riall, which stated that the enemy was advancing in great force against his position. Upon receiving this alarming intelligence the general rode rapidly forward, and on reaching Lundy's Lane, to his intense surprise and disappointment, instead of finding the ground occupied by General Riall's entire division, as he expected, he discovered the light brigade alone retiring in the face of the enemy, the head of whose columns was already within a few hundred yards of the crest of the hill, and the woods on either side of the road swarming with their riflemen. The narrow road in the rear leading to Queenston was choked by Morrison's advancing column, which had just come into view, and retreat was in a manner impossible without hazarding disaster. Drummond's resolution was promptly taken. He at once countermanded the movement, and ordered up Lieut. Tomkins with his twenty-four pounders, to hold the Americans in check until the remainder of the troops could come up and form.

Shortly after his arrival at Lundy's Lane, Pearson had despatched Captain W. H. Merritt with a few Provincial dragoons to reconnoitre, and the entire American army was discovered quietly encamped beyond the Chippawa. When General Riall came up, he sent off an orderly with a message, directing the advance of Colonel Scott's brigade and a portion of the reserve, leaving the main body of the

1. Letters of Veritas.

militia and Indians still encamped near the Twelve Mile Creek.

In the course of the afternoon General Brown learned that the British had advanced in considerable force along the right bank of the river, and had taken possession of Lewiston, and were then supposed to be advancing upon Schlosser. He had sent most of his baggage away, reserving only one tent to every ten men, and obtained a good supply of provisions from beyond the Niagara. His men had been refreshed by two days' rest, the British force was divided, and he believed the favorable moment for executing his movement towards Burlington had arrived. The force that had appeared at Lundy's Lane was reported by his scouts to consist entirely of light troops and militia, sent forward, it was conjectured, for the purpose of watching his movements and picking up stragglers. His entire division was immediately placed under arms, and at four o'clock General Scott, with his own brigade, accompanied by Towson's company of artillery with three guns, and the whole body of cavalry and mounted riflemen, was directed to march upon Queenston, and if he encountered the enemy in force to report the fact at once, when he would be supported by the entire division.

Near Table Rock there stood a small tavern kept by a Mrs. Wilson, which had escaped the general devastation of the frontier. As the head of Scott's column approached this house, several British officers were observed to come out and mount their horses. Some of them instantly galloped off and disappeared behind the belt of woods beyond, but one elderly man halted in the middle of the road, and coolly surveyed their movements until they had come within short musket-shot, when he saluted a party of American officers riding in front, and rode rapidly after his companions. They found the land-lady nervous, but communicative. She expressed her regret that they had not advanced with greater speed, as they might have easily captured the whole of her late guests, and estimated General Riall's force, which she described very circumstantially, at double its actual strength. The sound of many bugles was heard in and beyond the woods, and Scott at once despatched a staff-officer to demand instant reinforcements.¹ The remainder of the American army being already under arms, it was immediately put in motion.²

The exact strength of Brown's division at that date is difficult to ascertain. He admitted the loss of 320 officers and men in the action at Chippawa, but it has been stated to have been considerably greater by a friendly writer.³ Forty or fifty more had been killed or taken in skirmishes since; a small garrison had been left at Fort Erie, and a detachment sent to Schlosser. He had been three weeks in

1. Douglass' Reminiscences. 2. Brown to Armstrong, Aug. 7. 3. Paris M. Davis puts it at 60 killed, 316 wounded, 19 missing

Canada, and his force must naturally have been reduced by the disease and fatigue incident to a campaign in the field. His regular regiments had been considerably diminished by desertion, no less than six deserters having come into the British lines in a single day, while his militia had probably suffered in a still greater degree from the same cause. He distinctly stated that the whole of his Indians had left him.¹ On the other hand, a well-informed writer asserts that a number of them were still serving with his army as scouts.²

On the other hand, too, he had received considerable reinforcements. As soon as it was known that he had passed the Niagara, troops were put in motion from Detroit, Ohio, and Sackett's Harbor, to support him. A letter in the *Baltimore Patriot*, dated July 12th, relates that upon the day after the action at Chippawa he was joined by about one thousand men from Buffalo, regulars, volunteers and Indians, among them Captain Stone's mounted riflemen, 160 strong. On July 16th, deserters who arrived in the British camp reported that 700 men had just crossed over from Lewiston.³ This reinforcement was composed of detachments of the 11th, 22d and 23d regiments.⁴ Rumors of disaster having become current before intelligence of the battle had been actually received, the editor of *Niles' Register*, published in Baltimore, took occasion to observe in the issue of July 30th: "General Brown has received some handsome reinforcements from Buffalo, and there is no reason to believe he cannot maintain his ground for some time." The most authoritative evidence on the subject, however, is to be found in a pamphlet published by General Ripley in 1815, vindicating his conduct, which has now become very rare. It contains an official return showing the effective strength of the two brigades of infantry upon the 23d July to have been 136 officers and 2,620 non-commissioned officers and privates.⁵ Upon the 24th we are informed that 100 of the 22d Infantry under Lieut. Guy, and 220 of the 1st under Colonel Nicholas, who were not included in this return, arrived from Fort Erie. Then he supplies a second return, showing the effective strength of Porter's brigade upon the 30th July, five days after the action, to have been 61 officers and 538 rank and file, and that of the artillery on the same date, 12 officers and 260 rank and file.⁶ The loss of these corps in the action, according to the official published return, was 112 of all ranks, but this certainly does not include loss from desertion and straggling, which, in a militia force especially, is commonly very great after a reverse. This, however, gives a grand total of 4,059 officers and men. The general staff, dragoons, mounted infantry, and a detachment of

1. Brown to Armstrong, July 23. 2. Clark, Onondaga, p. 320. 3. Riall to Drummond, July 17.

4. Interesting account by a musician. 5. 1st Brigade, 84 officers, 1422 N. C. O. and privates; 2d Brigade, 52 officers 1190 N. C. O. and privates.—Return signed by S. Griffith, A. A. G. 6. J. L. Thomson states the strength of the artillery engaged at 367.

engineers, still remain to be accounted for, but of these no returns are available. Making due allowance for these and the probable understatement of the loss of the militia brigade, it is safe to say that Brown had under arms on the evening of the 25th of July at least 4,500 of all ranks, of whom upwards of 3,500 were regulars. A certain proportion probably were detailed for camp service, but after making a reasonable deduction for this, he still must have been able to bring more than 4,000 men into action, with nine pieces of field artillery, three of which were 18-pounders, and one a 5½-inch howitzer. In fact a letter dated at Buffalo next day, giving a very accurate account of the battle, states his force engaged at precisely that number.¹ In artillery he possessed a decided preponderance from the beginning of the action, an advantage which was only partially counterbalanced by the excellence of the position occupied by the British guns.*

Leaving the Queenston road at nearly a right angle, Lundy's Lane followed a course almost due west for about half a mile, thence,

1. Poulson's American.

* Mr. Adams, in many respects one of the fairest and most painstaking of American historians, attempts to show that Gen. Brown had but 2,644 effective men at Chippawa on the 25th July. He accomplishes this by leaving out of account all the officers, the whole of the 1st regiment, the dragoons and mounted infantry, detachments of the 17th, 19th, 22nd, and rifles, and all details for duty of any kind which would prevent a man from being actually on the parade-ground at roll-call. He also reckons the strength of the artillery and Porter's brigade as it stood in the return of the 30th July. The American returns cited are misleading in this way, that "present for duty" actually means "present under arms," omitting all guards, pickets, escorts, working parties — frequently one third of the strength — and the "aggregate present and absent" includes sick men, those on command, etc. However, the following return, exhumed by him, is not without value:

Strength of 1st Brigade, Fort Erie, 31st July, 1814.

	Present for Duty.		Aggregate Present and Absent.
	N. C. O. and men.	Officers.	
9th	139	8	569
11th	293	11	624
22nd	218	10	408
25th	255	7	676
General Staff		4	4
	905	40	2281
2nd Brigade.			
1st	141	6	220
21st	441	20	849
23rd	292	12	713
General Staff		4	4
	874	42	1786
Monthly return of troops under Gen. Brown, Fort Erie, 31st July, 1814.			
Bombardiers, etc	58	2	69
Light Dragoons	47	1	64
Artillery Corps	241	12	364
First Brigade	905	40	2281
Second Brigade	874	42	1786
	2125	97	4564

It is quite preposterous to suppose that Gen. Brown would have affirmed his ability to march in any direction over the country and to conquer Upper Canada within two months if he had only 2,600 men at his command. His despatches before Lundy's Lane all bear the stamp of conscious numerical superiority — those of Drummond and Riall indicate a knowledge of their inferiority. It will be observed that Porter's brigade is entirely omitted from the foregoing return, although what remained of it was unquestionably present at Fort Erie on that date.

trending gradually northward, crossed the Twelve Mile Creek at DeCew's Falls. About a hundred yards west of the junction of the roads, on the south side of Lundy's Lane, stood a Presbyterian church, a low frame building, painted red. It occupied the highest point of the rise, which slopes gently southward and westward, but dips more abruptly to the east and north. On the right of the church lay a small enclosure, in which a few weatherbeaten wooden slabs and rude brown headstones, with sometimes a brief inscription roughly carved upon them by the village blacksmith's chisel, but more often nameless, marked the graves of the fathers of the settlement. Hither, too, brave young Cecil Bisshop was borne by mourning comrades upon their return from that daring raid in which he met his death, and here he still reposes. Southward, a thriving young orchard covered the slope below the graveyard, extending quite to the edge of the Portage Road and encircling a small dwelling and farmyard. Meadows and cultivated fields lay beyond, bounded by thick woods less than half a mile away on both sides of the road, stretching down to the river near Table Rock, and skirting the brink of the chasm for a long distance.

Dreading an ambush, Scott carefully reconnoitred these woods with his cavalry, and his delay enabled the British light troops to regain the position they had just abandoned. Then, as now, Lundy's Lane was bordered by many apple, cherry and peach trees, thrusting their projecting boughs over the highway. In these orchards the Glengarry Light Infantry took up their ground, forming the right wing of the British line of battle. Tomkins' two field guns with the rocket party were planted among the graves on the very summit of the knoll beside the church, so as to sweep the road. The detachment of the 8th and the Incorporated Militia were posted lower down, behind the fences and in the fields on the left of the main road extending towards the river, but leaving an interval of more than two hundred yards unoccupied next the bank, which was thickly overgrown with scrub-pine and brushwood. The extremities of both wings were inclined slightly forward. The remainder of Morrison's column was formed in rear of the guns, under shelter of the ridge, as fast as it came up, and the troop of the 19th Dragoons was posted on the high road some distance further away.¹ Small parties of the 1st and 2nd Lincoln Militia continued to arrive from the various outposts occupied by them during the day, and joined the light troops in the woods on the flanks. No better ground for receiving an attack could be found for many a mile. The entire number of all ranks in the field when this formation was accomplished was 1,637, of whom about one-half were Provincial troops.² Soon after the battle began, the light

1. Drummond to Prevost, July 27: Lossing. 2. Auchinleck.

company of the Royals arrived from Twenty Mile Creek and a courier was sent off to countermand the march of the remainder of Colonel Scott's column, which it was learned had taken the road from the Beechwoods to Queenston, and pilot it to the field.

It has become the fashion among American writers to describe Drummond's force as being largely composed of Wellington's veterans. With the exception of Colonel Scott, and possibly a few other officers, who may have exchanged from other regiments, it is safe to say that not a man in the entire division had ever served under that illustrious commander, and very few of them had seen active service of any kind outside of Canada.

As the Americans emerged from the woods, the 9th, 11th, and 22nd regiments deployed in the fields on the left and the 25th on the right of the road, while their field-guns came to the front and unlimbered upon the highway. The brigade of infantry numbered 1,506 of all ranks, and the artillery, dragoons, and other mounted corps, consisting of two troops of U. S. dragoons and the New York commands of Boughton and Stone, probably mustered 300 more, making a total force of 1,800 fighting men.¹

Retiring leisurely before the advancing enemy, the British skirmishers frequently halted and formed as if with the intention of making a stand, then dispersed again as soon as their position was seriously threatened. Much valuable time was gained by these manœuvres, which were continued until the vanguard of the American army had approached within half musket-shot of their fighting line, when they finally ran in.²

The sun was about half an hour high, or, in other words, it was between six and seven o'clock in the afternoon, when Scott began the engagement by a general attack of light troops along the entire front of the British position. On the right, the Glengarries easily maintained their ground, but a section of the Royal Scots which had just come up, startled by the sudden apparition among the trees in their front of a body of men in green uniforms, resembling those of the American riflemen they had encountered that morning at Lewiston, hastily fired a volley upon them, which injured several and produced some confusion.³

Having felt the force opposed to him in this manner for a few minutes, and satisfied himself that it was determined to fight where it stood, General Scott formed the 11th and 22nd United States Infantry for a direct frontal attack, and detailed the 9th and 25th to turn both flanks simultaneously.

The centre attack was not pushed with vigor, and was easily

1. Ripley, C. K. Gardner, Dict. U. S. Army. 2. Letter in Northern Sentinel, 19th August, 1814.
3. United Service Journal, 1845.

repelled by the artillery fire alone. But upon the left of the line, the Americans soon obtained a decided advantage. Observing the belt of unoccupied ground next to the river, Scott ordered Colonel T. S. Jesup, with the 25th U. S. Infantry, to make a wide circuit through the undergrowth in that direction, and, by turning Drummond's flank, attempt to gain possession of the Queenston road in the rear. Favored by the approach of night and concealed from view by thickets, that regiment made its way unperceived into the interval, and suddenly attacking the battalion of Incorporated Militia in flank at the moment it was attempting to take ground further to the left, threw it into confusion, and took four officers and near a hundred men prisoners. Following up his advantage, Jesup advanced rapidly as far as the road, which he occupied in force, and the troop of the 19th, finding a strong body of infantry firing upon them from the enclosures on their flank, retired as far as Muddy Run.¹ Nor was this the full measure of his success. First, Captain Loring, A.D.C. to General Drummond, riding to the rear to bring up the cavalry, was captured, then General Riall, himself, bleeding from a wound, which subsequently caused the amputation of his arm, fell into his power in the same manner. The prisoners were promptly hurried from the field, and when their rank was announced to the remainder of the brigade it became the signal for loud and prolonged cheering along the entire line, caught up and repeated by Ripley's and Porter's advancing columns.

Scarcely had these sounds died away, when a shell from the British battery struck one of Towson's ammunition wagons, which instantly blew up with a great explosion. This incident was hailed in turn by exulting shouts from the successful gunners, who redoubled their efforts in consequence, and the American pieces were speedily overpowered by their fire, and almost, if not quite, silenced. The remnant of the Incorporated Militia quickly recovered from its confusion, and re-formed in rear of the 89th, fronting the Queenston road, and covering the flank and rear of the troops in Lundy's Lane.² Their musketry soon compelled Jesup to relinquish the position he had secured, and communication with the rear was re-opened.³ Lieut.-Col. Robinson being dangerously wounded, the command of this corp devolved on Major James Kerby.

A general advance of the 9th, 11th and 22nd Infantry, converging upon the British guns, forced the 89th and the detachments of the 8th and Royal Scots to advance to their support, and was not repelled without a sharp struggle, in which both parties suffered heavily. Lieut. Hemphill, leading the Royals, after Capt. Brereton was disabled, was killed, and the command of his party, the remnant of

1. Merritt; Reminiscence of L. Palmer, MSS. 2. Drummond to Prevost, July 27. 3. Lossing.

three companies, devolved on another young subaltern, Lieut. Fraser. Colonel Morrison was so severely wounded that he was carried from the field, and Major Clifford assumed command of the 89th, while Captain Campbell, commanding the 8th, had his horse killed beneath him. Their assailants finally retired, leaving the slope strewed with their dead and wounded, and were rallied with difficulty under cover of their artillery. The 22nd in particular broke in great confusion, running across the front of the 11th when in the act of wheeling, and carrying away several platoons of that regiment in its flight. Their officers failed to check the fugitives until they had gained the shelter of the woods, and only a part of them could then be induced to return to the scene of action.¹

In the course of this contest the Americans had been reinforced, in the first instance by Lieut. Riddle with 100 men, then by Ripley's brigade, and finally by General Brown with the entire reserve.

Biddle's and Ritchie's companies of artillery, with six guns, advanced to Towson's assistance, and the artillery duel was resumed with redoubled energy. Notwithstanding the disparity in numbers, the British guns still maintained a decided superiority. Captains Biddle and Ritchie were both wounded, the latter mortally, and Towson is said to have lost twenty-seven out of thirty-six men serving his three guns.²

Colonel McRee, an engineer officer, who was acting as General Brown's chief of staff, finally assured the American commander that he need not hope for ultimate success unless the hill was taken and the guns silenced.³ By this time the entire available force of his division had arrived. Scott's command was much exhausted and diminished in numbers. Accordingly, Ripley's brigade, consisting of the 1st, 21st, and 23rd Infantry, besides detachments of the 2nd Rifles, 17th and 19th Infantry, was formed for the main attack, having Porter's brigade, composed of Dobbin's and Swift's New York regiments, Fenton's Pennsylvania battalion, and Willcocks' Canadian Volunteers, upon their left, while the 25th U.S.I. still maintained its position in the thickets on the right.⁴ The numbers at his disposal, if properly handled, were amply sufficient to crush the very inferior force opposed to them before relief could arrive.

For a few minutes firing almost ceased, and this interval was employed by the American artillerymen in bringing forward fresh supplies of ammunition, and perfecting their arrangement for a general advance. Owing to the growing darkness, artillery fire had ceased to be very effective, for although the moon had risen its light was rendered faint and uncertain by drifting clouds of smoke and

1. Major McNeil's Evidence. 2. Peterson, *Heroes of U. S.* 3. Lossing. 4. Brown to Armstrong, Aug. 7.

dust, and the position of either line of battle was only indicated at irregular intervals by the flash of its guns.¹

The action had now continued for nearly three hours; the British force had been reduced by casualties to less than twelve hundred officers and men, and its situation seemed perilous in the extreme. Their ammunition was nearly exhausted and the militia were deprived of their remaining stock of cartridges, which were distributed among the regulars. It could no longer be a matter of doubt that they had to contend with the entire American army. But relief, though long delayed, was now close at hand. After the original order of march had been countermanded, the troops encamped at Twelve Mile Creek remained quietly in their quarters until afternoon. Then the order was received from General Riall directing a portion of the force to advance immediately to his support, by way of DeCew's Falls and Lundy's Lane. This meant a march of fourteen miles under a burning sun. Colonel Scott instantly obeyed, taking with him seven companies of his own regiment (the 103rd), seven companies of the Royal Scots, Lieut.-Col. John Gordon, five companies of the 8th, Major Evans, the flank companies of the 104th, Capt. R. Leonard, and a few picked men selected from some of the Militia battalions* in camp, under Lieut.-Col. Hamilton, yet, owing to the weak state of the companies, his entire column did not muster more than 1,200 of all ranks.² This force was accompanied by three 6-pounders and a 5½-inch howitzer, under Captain Mackonochie. The advance-guard was already within three miles of the field of battle when they were met by an orderly bearing a second despatch from General Riall, announcing that he was about to retire upon Queenston, and directing them to retreat at once and join him at that place. They had retraced their steps for nearly four miles when the roar of cannon burst upon their ears and they were overtaken by a second messenger, summoning them to the scene of conflict. It was accordingly nine o'clock before the head of this column, weary and footsore with a march of more than twenty miles almost without a halt, came in view on the extreme right.³

The action was recommenced by a brisk attack on the left of the British position by the 25th United States Infantry, from the shelter of the copsewood near the Queenston road.

The American artillery opened fire with renewed vigor to cover the advance of their infantry, and Porter's riflemen were detached, creeping stealthily forward on the right, in the hope of turning the flank also. Drummond promptly foiled this movement by directing the headquarter wing of the Royals and the flank companies of the

1. Peterson. 2. Drummond to Prevost July 27. 3. Letters of Veritas.

*The Lincoln, Norfolk, Oxford, Middlesex and York regiments, and Essex and Kent Rangers.

104th to prolong his fighting line in that direction while he formed the remainder of Colonel Scott's column into a second line in rear of Lundy's Lane.¹ These dispositions had not yet been entirely completed when a large body of infantry was again observed advancing upon the artillery. The troops destined for the assault of the battery, composed of the 1st U. S. Infantry, Colonel R. C. Nicholas, detachments of the 17th, 19th and 2nd Rifles and the whole of the 21st, under command of Colonel James Miller, had quietly been formed in the hollow, where their movements were concealed by the darkness, and now advanced silently in line, two deep, followed by the 23rd, Major D. McFarland, in close column of companies, under cover of the discharge of all their artillery, which concentrated its fire upon the British guns. These battalions mustered upward of 1,400 bayonets.² The position occupied by the 1st U.S. Infantry, forming the centre of their line, compelled that regiment, fresh from a tour of uneventful garrison duty in the distant frontier posts on the banks of the Mississippi, to climb the slope in the face of the point-blank fire of the British guns, while Miller's and McFarland's commands moved obliquely upon the battery from either flank. Scarcely had it begun to feel the effects of the artillery fire when this regiment gave way, and before it could be rallied by its officers, had retired a considerable distance in much disorder.³ The 23rd advanced with admirable firmness and lost heavily. Its commander was killed and the line began to waver, but order was soon restored by the efforts of General Ripley, who directed its movements in person after the fall of Major McFarland.⁴ Miller's approach on the opposite flank was screened from the view of the gunners by the church and an almost continuous line of thickets fringing both sides of a shallow ravine.⁵ Within twenty yards of the guns a stout log-fence, skirted with shrubbery and small trees, crossed their path and furnished convenient cover. Up to this point their advance had been unobserved by the artillerymen, whose attention was riveted upon the batteries below. Halting there for a moment, they fired a single effective volley, and, rushing forward, gained the summit, but with heavy loss.⁶ Lieut. Cilley, who led the charge, cut down an artilleryman as he entered the battery and the next moment fell desperately wounded by his side. A few gunners still clung desperately to their pieces and were bayoneted while striving to reload, and the battery, which had been worked so effectively against them, was in their possession. Both the 24-pounders and one of Captain Mackonochie's 6-pounders, which had since been brought up to their assistance, were taken. Lieut. Tomkins and a few of his men were also captured and temporarily confined in the church, whence most of them soon succeeded in making their escape.⁷

1. Drummond to Prevost, July 27. 2. Ripley, official return. 3. Brown to Armstrong 4 Ibid.
5. Jacobs' Life of P. Gass. 6. Lieut. Bigelow was killed and Capt. Burbank, Lieuts. Cilley and Fisk
and Ensigns Jones, Thomas and Camp were wounded in taking the guns - J. L. Thompson 7. Lossing,
Drummond, Browne, England's Artillerymen; Letter in Alexandria Herald.

Nearly at the same instant Ripley came up with the 23rd, and the 1st, having re-formed, advanced to their support. Ripley's entire brigade was thus massed on a very narrow front, on the south side of Lundy's Lane, between the church and the Queenston road. Scott's brigade, with the exception of the 25th Infantry, was rapidly brought forward and took post on their left, while Porter's volunteers distantly engaged the flank companies of the 104th, and the wing of the Royals.¹

Miller's movement had been at once so rapid, unexpected and successful, that the British guns were in his possession before the infantry in rear had time to advance for their protection. These detachments then hastily advanced to recover them, but after a very severe contest were repelled with heavy loss. At short range the cartridges of the Americans, containing in addition to the ordinary bullets three large buck-shot, were particularly effective. Lieutenant Fraser, on whom the command of the Royals in this part of the field had devolved, was wounded, and the survivors of his detachment rallied around the colors of the 89th. The 103rd being ordered to advance, marched in the darkness directly into the centre of the enemy's new position, and were first made aware of its mistake by a crushing volley, which threw them into great disorder.² While this struggle was in progress for the possession of the hill, the American artillery limbered up and advanced to take up a new position upon the summit. In the attempt they met with sudden and unforeseen disaster. While their howitzer was ascending the slope at a gallop, a volley of musketry brought nearly all the drivers at once to the ground, and the horses, missing their riders and left without guidance, plunged frantically forward into the opposing ranks, where they were soon secured.³ Several of their caissons were blown up at different times by congreve rockets, and some of their pieces silenced for want of ammunition. Many horses were also killed or disabled while manœuvring.

The remainder of the British artillery was at the same time brought forward until the muzzles of the guns were only a few yards asunder, and the battle thenceforward became a confused, ferocious, and sanguinary struggle, waged frequently at the bayonet's point, or with clubbed muskets, the British striving desperately to regain the ground they had lost, and their opponents to thrust them down into the hollow beyond, and drive them from the field. Regiments, companies, and sections were broken up and mingled together. They retired, rallied, and were led to the charge again. For two hours the contending lines were scarcely ever more than twenty yards apart, and by the light of each successive volley of musketry they could

¹ Miller's letter to his wife, July 28 -- J. L. Thompson, Hist. Late War. ² James, Mil. Occ. ³ Letter of E. L. Allen, 21st U.S.I., in Pittsfield (Mass.) Sun.

plainly distinguish the faces of their antagonists, and even the buttons on their coats. From time to time even the voices of the officers could be distinctly heard in the opposing lines. General Drummond shouted to his men, "Stick to them, my fine fellows." An American officer responded by giving an order to "Level low and fire at their flashes," in stentorian tones.¹ It is scarcely possible to present a consecutive narrative of the closing hours of the strife. For upwards of an hour the combatants faced each other at a distance of not more than sixty or seventy feet, loading and firing with as much deliberation, one of them wrote, "as if it had been a sham battle." From time to time there was a sudden rush forward, and the lines swayed slowly backwards and forwards over the ground, which was now thickly strewn with the bodies of their fallen comrades. It is asserted by the Americans that they three times repelled the attempts of their adversaries to regain their lost position.² In one of these, we learn that the 103rd, being largely a boy-regiment and this its first experience of battle, again gave way, and was only rallied by the strenuous exertions of Major Smelt and other officers.³ In another, the assailants forced their way into Major's Hindman's battery and compelled him to spike two of his guns.⁴ In the short interval between these attacks, Generals Brown and Scott consulted together, and, in consequence, Scott's brigade was moved into a narrow road or lane a short distance south of Lundy's Lane, where it deployed and took post in line immediately in front of their artillery, which was now rendered nearly useless by the very proximity of the contending forces. Upon the repulse of the second attack, Scott formed his regiments into close column, left in front, and hoping to profit by the disorder in the British ranks, led them to the charge in turn. The 89th, kneeling to receive them in a field of grain, reserved its fire, by Drummond's command, until its assailants were within twenty paces, when a volley was delivered with such fatal effect that they recoiled in confusion to the rear, vigorously pursued at the point of the bayonet.⁵ Their place in the line was at once occupied by a portion of General Porter's brigade, and Colonel Leavenworth rallied and reformed the broken platoons upon the left of their former position. Having changed front, they were again led forward by their indomitable commander, who had already had two horses killed under him, in an effort to force back the British right. Again repelled with heavy loss, they were again rallied, this time on the extreme left of the line.⁶ General Scott was himself wounded by a musket ball, which fractured his shoulder, and, having likewise received a painful contusion in the side, was removed from the field. His regimental commanders, Colonels Brady,

1. McLeod's view of settlement of Upper Canada. 2. Lossing, J. L. Thomson, etc 3 Drummond.
4. E. L. Allen. 5. "The effect of that single fire on the enemy's ranks was awful in the extreme." David Thomson, Hist. of the Late War, p. 233-4. 6. J. L. Thomson.

Jesup and McNeil, and his Brigade-Major, Smith, had also been disabled. The 11th and the 22nd United States Infantry went entirely to pieces, and the 9th alone preserved its formation, kept together by the exertions of Leavenworth, its colonel, who was likewise wounded.¹ The entire brigade had shrunk to the dimensions of one weak battalion, stumbling blindly about the field.* More than half the officers of these regiments had been killed or badly hurt, and it was subsequently related by deserters that on one occasion, being hard pressed, the survivors actually threw down their arms and attempted to surrender in a body, but finding that the British still continued their fire, resumed their weapons in despair.² Be this as it may, the list of killed and wounded bore eloquent testimony to the courage and determination with which they had maintained the contest. Before the close of the action the number of effective men remaining in the field of the four regiments composing General Scott's brigade was actually reduced to 150 or 200, exclusive of officers.³

About the same time General Brown received a flesh wound in the thigh, and finding that Scott had already retired from the field, made over the chief command to General Ripley. The two remaining brigades had suffered less, but their losses had been severe, and most of the regiments were much shaken. The new commander, with the entire approval of his chief, determined to retire beyond the Chippawa.⁴ With this intention, all the guns that could be horsed were withdrawn, and some of the wounded removed.

While Ripley was preparing to retreat, Drummond was resolutely reforming his shattered battalions for a final and supreme effort to retrieve the fortunes of the fight. Bleeding profusely from a wound in the neck, which narrowly missed being fatal, he paid so little attention to it that he did not even dismount to have it dressed. Twenty minutes later his horse was shot dead beneath him.⁵ Colonel Pearson, Lieut.-Colonel Robinson, and many officers of inferior rank

1. Lossing. 2. Drummond to Prevost, August 8. 3. Col. Leavenworth's evidence. 4. Brown to Armstrong, August 7. Ripley, Major Hindman's evidence. 5. James. Ridout Letters. Thos. Ridout to his son, 14th Aug., 1814: "The coolness of Gen. Drummond on that memorable night, in the performance of all his duties, was beyond all praise. His wound in the neck was very severe and has been very troublesome."

*The aimless wanderings of this brigade are circumstantially described in "A brief review of the settlement of Upper Canada by the U. E. Loyalists and Scotch Highlanders in 1783, by D. McLeod, Major-General, Patriot Army; Cleveland, 1841":—"The commanding officer of the 89th was ordered to charge this column of Americans, which was promptly executed by driving them down the slope of the hill; but they instantly rallied at the base and in their turn charged the Royals and drove them some distance to the rear. The 89th coming up at this time in their rear mistook them for the Royals and were letting them pass on as such, but while they were reclining to the left they had to advance in front of the Grenadiers of the 104th and 103rd regiments, who were in the act of firing at them, when a British field officer rode up and ordered them not to fire as it was the 89th. The Americans took the hint and called out 'the 89th.' The word 'recover arms' was given, and as they were advancing towards their own lines they came in contact with a strong detachment of the 49th (41st?) and Royals, who by some accident were far in advance of their own lines. A dreadful scene ensued. It was for some minutes the reign of carnage, shoulder to shoulder, foot to foot; the combatants fought with more than mortal energy. *** The Glengarries marched to the assistance of their friends, but from the darkness of the night mistook the 49th and Royals for the Americans, which enabled the latter to retire unmolested."

had been disabled. Nearly one-third of the rank and file had already been numbered with the dead, or were suffering from wounds. With indomitable resolution the scattered detachments were rallied and the line reformed for another attack. Finally, when it was almost midnight, the thinned and wearied ranks were again closed and urged up the hillside. Headed by the light company of the 41st, led by Captain Glew, they pressed steadily up the slope, and at length stood triumphantly upon the summit.¹ Their opponents were surprised in the act of retiring, and their rearguard was easily overthrown and dispersed. The two 24-pounders they had lost were recovered, but the 6-pounder had been already removed. An American field-piece of the same calibre was, however, taken, the whole of the detachment serving it with but two exceptions having fallen in its defence.² The officer commanding the party at the guns put spurs to his horse and escaped, but most of his men were taken prisoners beside them. Several tumbrils and horses were also captured, and the ridge was profusely strewn with the bodies of those seriously injured. Desultory firing continued in various quarters of the field for a few minutes longer, under cover of which General Ripley withdrew from the field all of his troops that still held together.

Almost all American writers, following the cue furnished by General Brown's official letter, convey the impression that their forces retired voluntarily, and were not expelled from the position they had won, and none of them admit the loss of any artillery. The statements on these points contained in Sir Gordon Drummond's official letter are, however, fully substantiated by affidavits published in General Ripley's pamphlet already referred to, as well as by several letters from officers and men in the American army, which appeared in different contemporary newspapers. Major Hindman, commandant of their artillery, testified, for instance, that "General Brown said to him:—'Collect your artillery as well as you can, and retire immediately; we will all march to camp together.' He then remarked that nearly all his officers had been killed or wounded, and that he himself was wounded, and he thought it best to retire. I found the enemy in possession of the guns and wagons. Some of the horses and men were captured. I then left the field. Lieut. Fontaine informed me that the enemy charged his party at the guns, and made them all prisoners, but that he dashed through their ranks and escaped."³

Equally conclusive is the evidence respecting the demoralized condition of the American army, derived from the same sources. We are informed that but two platoons of Scott's brigade could be collected under Leavenworth, and several officers affirmed that not

1. Gourlay. 2. E. L. Allen. 3. Ripley, *Facts relative to the Campaign on the Niagara*.

more than 500 men in all returned to camp in a body, the remainder having dispersed.¹

The battlefield remained in the undisturbed possession of the British during the remainder of the night, but they were in no condition to pursue their disorganized enemies. Pearson's brigade had marched fourteen miles, and had been deprived of sleep the night before; Morrison's detachment had accomplished the same distance; and the remainder not less than twenty-one miles in the heat of a July day. Almost one-third of their entire number had been killed or wounded, or were missing. The survivors were utterly exhausted, and threw themselves down to rest among the dead and dying upon the bloodstained hill they had finally re-conquered.

Thus ended the most stubbornly-contested and sanguinary engagement ever fought in the Province of Ontario, after having continued five hours and twenty-three minutes.² By American writers it is frequently styled the battle of Bridgewater or Niagara Falls; in British official records, it is known by the name of Niagara, and, in commemoration of the fact, the Royal Scots, 8th, 41st and 89th, bear that word emblazoned on their colors, but among Canadians it usually receives the more homely appellation of Lundy's Lane.³

The loss on both sides was extremely severe in proportion to the number of combatants engaged, and, according to the official reports, nearly equal. The British return showed an aggregate of five officers and seventy-six men killed, thirty officers and 532 men wounded, fourteen officers and 219 men missing and prisoners; that of their opponents, eleven officers and 160 men killed, three generals (Brown, Scott and Porter), fifty other officers and 520 men wounded, eight officers and 109 men missing. But there are several cogent reasons for suspecting the truthfulness of the latter return. James asserts that 210 of their dead were counted on the field by British fatigue parties, and that indications of a number of new-made graves were afterwards discovered near their camp. Drummond stated in his official letter that several hundred prisoners had fallen into his hands, and it would be indeed remarkable that a force in the admitted state of disorganization to which the American army was reduced should have lost no more than the number returned as missing, especially when a considerable proportion of that force consisted of militia acknowledged to be unusually prone to desert and disperse in the event of a reverse, while their opponents, who held the field, lost more than double that number.

An officer writing from Buffalo, two days after the battle, to his father, a Senator in Congress, stated that their first brigade (Scott's)

1. Ripley, Facts relative to the Campaign on the Niagara; Wilson, American Military and Naval Heroes.

2. Letter dated Fort Erie, July 28, in Alexandria Herald. 3. On St. George's day, April 23rd, 1822, colors were presented by Sir Peregrine Maitland, Lieut.-Governor of Upper Canada, to the York Militia as representatives of the Incorporated Militia, in recognition of their services during the war, inscribed with the word "Niagara," by direction of King George IV.

was almost annihilated, yet the official return only admitted a loss of a little more than five hundred men, or about one-third of its effective force.¹ Major Foster testified that but fifteen or twenty of the 11th escaped unhurt.² Major Hindman relates that of Tappan's Company of the 23rd, U. S. I., numbering forty-five rank and file when it went into action, only nine answered to their names at roll-call next morning, and estimated that not more than 1,500 men of the entire division could then be mustered.³ I have already referred to the loss of Towson's artillery. At one of Captain Ritchie's guns every man is said to have been disabled, at another all but two, and yet the entire loss of the whole of the artillery was returned at forty-six of all ranks.⁴ Detachments of the 2nd Rifles and 17th and 19th Infantry are known to have been engaged; one officer belonging to the former and two of the latter corps were certainly wounded, but no statement whatever of their loss is to be found in the official report. Finally, Major Herkimer and thirteen other officers of the volunteer brigade, in an open letter published in several newspapers, flatly accused General Brown of falsifying the returns and of understating the loss of their regiments.*

Mr. Hildreth states that the American army was reduced by their losses to sixteen hundred effective men. If this were true it would indicate a loss from casualties and desertion of more than two thousand.⁵ A very correct and circumstantial account of the action by an eye-witness, published in *Poulson's American*, estimated their loss in killed and wounded at twelve hundred. Another letter, dated at Fort Erie, August 1st, remarks: "Many of our men secreted themselves in the woods, and were not collected till within a few days." As they were not vigorously pursued it is probable that most of these stragglers rejoined their regiments.

On the part of the British, the battalions which bore the brunt of the action were the Royal Scots and the 89th, and their losses were correspondingly severe. Of about 500 men of the former regiment who went into action, 172 were reported killed, wounded, or missing, while the 89th lost not less than 254 out of an aggregate of 400 of all ranks. Of the provincial corps the Incorporated Militia suffered most, losing 142 officers and men, of whom not less than 92 were missing, out of about 300 engaged; the Glengarry Light Infantry lost 57; the 104th flank companies, 6; the Lincoln Militia, 13; the

1. Lieut. J. B. Varnum. 2. Ripley. In a letter in the *Northern Sentinel*, dated 19th August, 1814, an officer of the 11th stated that his company numbered 50 on the morning of the 25th, but only 13 were present at roll call next day, and but one man of his own platoon. Col. Miller, in a letter to his wife of the 28th July, (printed in the report of the Adjutant General of New Hampshire, for 1868) states the loss of his regiment (the 21st) at 126 of all ranks, yet in the official return it was stated to be only 104. 3. E. L. Allen. 4. Hist. U. S. 5. Official return (Can. Arch.)

* "The company (Stone's) entered the service 162 strong, and when mustered out numbered only 48 men. The others had either been killed in battle, died of wounds or camp disease, or been taken prisoners. But very few had deserted."—Doty History of Livingstone County, N. Y., p. 322.

Second York, 9; the Provincial Dragoons, 3.† Many of the wounded, being slightly injured by buckshot, were soon able to do duty again, and a number of the missing rejoined their regiments in a few days.¹

Next morning General Ripley again crossed the Chippawa with as large a force as he could muster, with the intention, as he stated, of burying the dead and recovering the wounded, whom he had left behind. Most of his officers agreed in regarding this as an act of the most consummate folly. But, finding the field occupied in force by his antagonist, he immediately retired, destroying the bridge behind him, and prepared for instant retreat.² The wounded and prisoners were then sent across the Niagara, a quantity of camp equipage and other stores were destroyed or thrown into the river, Bridgewater Mills and Clark's warehouse at Chippawa were burned, and a retrograde movement was effected with such celerity that, although they did not commence their march until noon, the entire force arrived on the heights opposite Black Rock at midnight in such a state of exhaustion that they lay down to sleep without pitching tents or lighting fires. This would certainly be extraordinary conduct on the part of a victorious army. In fact it is almost certain that their commander had determined to re-cross the river next day, but finding that he was not pursued in force, he encamped under the guns of Fort Erie, and set every available man at work with axe and spade to entrench his position.

As soon as Ripley's intention to retreat became apparent, the British light troops were sent in pursuit, and succeeded in making a few prisoners, but feeling himself too weak in numbers to attempt the investment of their fortified camp at Fort Erie, Sir Gordon Drummond dismissed the militia, who had come forward so cheerfully, and remained with the bulk of his force near Lundy's Lane until the arrival of reinforcements enabled him to prosecute his advantage further.³

1. Cannon, History Records British Army. 2. Letter of E. L. Allen; Musician's account. 3. G. O., July 26; Drummond to Prevost, July 31.

† In his official letter Sir Gordon Drummond said: "The zeal, loyalty and bravery with which the militia of this part of the Province have come forward to co-operate with His Majesty's troops in the expulsion of the enemy, and their conspicuous gallantry in this and the action of the 4th, claim my warmest thanks."

APPENDIX NO. 1.

STATE OF THE DEFENCES OF THE NIAGARA FRONTIER IN THE BEGINNING OF JULY, 1814—GEN. DRUMMOND'S SCHEME OF OPERATIONS.

Extract from report of Capt. Martin, R.E., to Sir George Prevost, Montreal, 3rd July, 1814:—

Fort Erie—In a tolerable state of defence, strongly enclosed in rear with palisades. A small blockhouse commenced, to flank the picketing. Three guns mounted—two twelves and one nine-pounder.

Chippawa—A line of intrenchments thrown up by the King's regiment on the left bank of the river; a redoubt commenced, to flank them.

Queenston—A redoubt completed for 250 men.

Fort Niagara—The land-front nearly completed and well excavated along the curtain; a splinter-proof, 140 feet in length, nearly completed with palisading.

Fort Missassauga—The new work in a forward state; the picketing and two furnaces completed; a brick tower commenced.

Fort George—For want of men the works do not advance rapidly.

Abstract of answers to questions submitted to officers of engineers, date about 12th July:—

Fort George is in a very bad state in reference to defence, and can make little or no resistance against an army computed at between 5,000 and 6,000 men, with a due proportion of heavy artillery, and the only thing to prevent it from being taken by assault is a bad row of picketing. If Fort George falls into the enemy's hands he will be enabled to carry on a regular attack against Fort Niagara on his own side of the river, which he would otherwise find difficult to do. Forts George and Niagara having fallen, Fort Missassauga will be very much weakened, as all the supplies without that fort will be cut off entirely. There is no secure cover for the garrison of Fort Missassauga, and it would soon fall if attacked by land, Fort Niagara being the protection of our supplies outside it. Fort Missassauga would not be easily taken by assault, but is incapable of holding out against a bombardment.

GEN. DRUMMOND'S SCHEME OF DEFENCE.

Maj.-Gen. Riall to Lieut.-Gen. Drummond, Fort George, 10th March, 1814—Abstract:—

Desires instructions in case of an attack, as both flanks are assailable. Fears that the Americans will land at Long Point, and by

advancing along the western road, get into his rear. There is a very small disposable force on this frontier, not adequate for its defence in front and to meet the probable movement in flank, and unless he receives a good reinforcement his position will be extremely critical.

Lieut.-Gen. Drummond to Maj.-Gen. Riall, Kingston, March 23:—

Thinks it highly probable that in connection with the siege of Fort Niagara the Americans will invade the district by the western road, and may land a force at Long Point or Point Abino. In such case he would be obliged to concentrate his whole force at Burlington or Ancaster, leaving the garrisons of Forts Niagara and George to themselves. He anticipates that General Harrison will be in command, and in case he (Riall) obtains previous information, in spite of his known caution, hopes that Harrison may give him an opportunity to defeat and destroy a considerable part of his force. Wishes him to understand that the abandonment of an advanced position is only advised in case of an advance in force from the west for purposes of concentration.

In case of small parties advancing from the westward, he is to send small parties from Burlington to take a position at Burford or Ancaster, and dispute the passage of the Grand River, on which the detachments from Long Point and Oxford may fall back.

The natural disposition of the forces would be to keep them concentrated in a central position in readiness to act on either flank, but the experience of the last two years shows that such force may be distributed along the frontier without any great risk, and all posts from Fort George to Erie should be occupied. That at Fort Erie should consist of a strong company of infantry and a party of artillery sufficient to man the 24-pounder in the southern demi-bastion, and may give employment to an invading force for a few days, or act in their rear. Chippawa to be strongly occupied, and a detachment posted between Chippawa and Fort Erie, say at Frenchman's Creek, and a rapid movement made to support the detachment on the right in case of a landing being made above Chippawa. Fort Niagara to be strongly occupied by 500 or 600 men, who may occupy ten times their number. I will reinforce your division by the 103rd, upwards of 700 strong, as soon as navigation opens. The occupation of Fort George is essential to the defence of Fort Niagara, and the construction of a battery of a few heavy guns so mounted as to bear on the esplanade of Fort Niagara.

In case of a concentration at Burlington a small detachment to be left in Fort George, which would in turn be protected by Fort Niagara, which commands it. A battery at Missassauga Point (the flagstaff) is highly necessary, and an enclosure at Queenston, if time permits.

APPENDIX NO. 2.

OFFICIAL RETURN OF THE LOSS OF BRITISH TROOPS IN ACTION OF JULY 25TH, 1814.

Staff—1 killed, 5 wounded, 1 missing.

19th Dragoons—2 rank and file wounded, 1 rank and file missing.

Provincial Light Dragoons—2 rank and file wounded, 1 captain missing.

Royal Engineers—1 subaltern missing.

Royal Artillery—4 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 12 rank and file wounded, 7 privates missing.

Royal Marine Artillery—3 rank and file wounded, 2 rank and file missing.

1st Royal Scots—1 subaltern, 15 privates killed; 3 officers, 112 N.C.O. and privates wounded; 2 officers, 39 N.C.O. and men missing.

8th Kings—12 N.C.O. and men killed; 3 officers, 57 N.C.O. and men wounded; 1 officer, 12 N.C.O. and men missing.

41st—3 privates killed, 34 N.C.O. and men wounded.

89th—2 officers, 27 N.C.O. and men killed; 11 officers, 177 N.C.O. and men wounded; 37 N.C.O. and men missing.

103rd—6 privates killed; 1 officer, 46 N.C.O. and men wounded; 3 officers, 4 N.C.O. and men missing.

104th—1 private killed, 5 privates missing.

Glengarry Light Infantry—4 privates killed; 1 officer, 30 N.C.O. and men wounded; 1 officer, 21 N.C.O. and men missing.

Incorporated Militia—1 officer, 6 men killed; 4 officers, 39 N.C.O. and men wounded; 75 N.C.O. and men missing; 3 officers, 14 men prisoners.

1st Lincoln Militia—1 private killed.

2nd Lincoln Militia—1 private wounded.

4th Lincoln Militia—2 officers, 3 men wounded; 2 officers missing.

5th Lincoln Militia—1 officer, 3 men wounded.

2nd York—3 officers, 6 men wounded.

OFFICIAL RETURN OF LOSS OF UNITED STATES TROOPS.

General Staff—2 wounded.

Light Dragoons—1 corporal killed, 2 privates wounded.

Artillery—1 officer, 9 N.C.O. and men killed; 3 officers, 32 N.C.O. and men wounded; 1 private missing.

1st Brigade.

Staff—3 officers wounded.

9th Infantry—3 officers, 13 N.C.O. and men killed; 8 officers, 81 N.C.O. and men wounded; 1 officer, 14 N.C.O. and men missing.

11th Infantry—1 officer, 27 N.C.O. and men killed; 7 officers, 95 N.C.O. and men wounded; 1 officer, 2 privates missing.

22nd Infantry—36 N.C.O. and men killed; 7 officers, 83 N.C.O. and men wounded; 3 officers, 14 N.C.O. and men missing.

25th Infantry—2 officers, 26 men killed; 4 officers, 62 N.C.O. and men wounded; 15 N.C.O. and men missing.

2nd Brigade.

1st Infantry—11 men killed; 2 officers, 18 men wounded; 2 N.C.O. and men missing.

21st Infantry—1 officer, 14 N.C.O. and privates killed; 6 officers, 64 N.C.O. and men wounded; 19 privates missing.

23rd Infantry—1 officer, 9 N.C.O. and men killed; 7 officers 45 N.C.O. and men wounded; 27 N.C.O. and men missing.

Porter's Brigade.

Staff—1 officer wounded, 1 officer missing.

Canadian Volunteers—1 private killed, 2 privates wounded, 8 privates missing.

Pennsylvania Volunteers—1 officer, 10 N.C.O. and men killed; 3 officers, 21 men wounded; 1 officer missing.

New York Volunteers—1 officer, 3 N.C.O. and men killed; 2 officers, 12 N.C.O. and men wounded; 1 officer missing.

APPENDIX NO. 3.

BRITISH OFFICERS KILLED.

Captain Spooner, 89th.
Lieut. Moorsom, 104th, D.A.A.G.
Lieut. Hemphill, 1st Royal Scots.
Lieut. Lathom, 89th.
Ensign Campbell, Incorporated Militia.

Wounded.

Lieut.-Gen. Drummond; Major-Gen. Riall; Lieut.-Cols. Morrison and Pearson; Capts. McLauchlan and Brereton; Lieuts. LeBreton, Haswell, Fraser, Noel, Sandeman, Steel, Pierce, Taylor, Lloyd, Miles, Redmond, Hooper, Langhorne and Kerr, of the regulars.

Lieut.-Col. Robinson; Majors Hatt and Simmons; Capts. Fraser, Washburn, McDonald, H. Nelles and Rockman; Lieuts. Dougall, Ruttan, Hamilton, Thompson, Orrfield and Smith; Ensigns McDonald and Kennedy, of the militia.

AMERICAN OFFICERS KILLED.¹

Major McFarland; Capts. Goodrich, Hooper, Hull, Kinney, Ritchie and Spencer; Lieuts. Armstrong, Bigelow, Burghardt, Davidson, Kehr, Poe, Sturgis and Turner; Ensign Hunter.

Wounded.

Major-General Brown; Brig.-Generals Porter and Scott; Colonel Brady; Lieut.-Cols. Dobbins, Jesup, Leavenworth and McNeil; Major Wood; Capts. Biddle, Bissel, Bliss, Burbank, Foster, Foulk, McMillan, Odell, Pentland, Smith and Worth; Lieuts. Abeel, Beans, Bedford, Blake, Brown, Camp, Campbell, Cilley, Cooper, Culbertson, Cushman, Dick, Dieterich, Ferguson, Fisher, Fisk, Fowle, Gifford, Haile, Ingersoll, Jacobs, Lamb, McChain, Maclay, O'Fling, Schmuck, Shaylor, Stephenson, Tappan, Thompson, Vasquez, Webster and Whiting; Ensigns Jacobs, Jones and Thomas.

1. Gardner Dict. U. S. Army.



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